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Corporate Heroin:
A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption†
M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler*

Abstract: We argue that firms undertake to reduce employee savings in order to avoid final
period problems that occur when employees accumulate enough wealth to retire and leave the
industry. Normally, reputation constrains employee behavior, since an employee who “cheats” at
one firm will then find herself unable to get a job at another. However, employees who have
saved such that they no longer care about continued employment will act opportunistically in the
final periods of employment, which can destroy much or all of the surplus otherwise created by
the employment relationship. We believe that this sort of final period cheating creates significant
problems for employees in positions of delicate trust, particularly those with a large variable
compensation component, such as corporate CEOs, securities professionals, and even corporate
lawyers.
Payment in-kind (perks), deferred compensation (corporate loans), and the
encouragement of employees’ conspicuous consumption—either through screening, inculcation,
or signaling—are strategies that firms enact to combat this final period problem of employee
cheating. Employees who reduce savings are more reliable over the long term than employees
who do not, since reduced savings makes employees more dependent upon remaining employed
into the future; these employees will invest in their reputations by engaging in less cheating. We
make an analogy to drug dependency: the employee who consumes all her resources immediately
enjoys large present utility, as does the addict, but is ultimately dependent on the firm to provide
her with the same opportunities in the future. Applying the theoretical framework we develop to
the real world can help explain much of observable behavior and compensation practice.
Thus, far from being prima facie evidence of corporate fraud—the picture painted by the
media, academia, and prosecutors at recent corporate trials—high levels of in-kind
compensation, corporate loans, and personal consumption may be evidence of optimal
incentivization, where principal and agent have contracted (explicitly or implicitly) for just the
amount and type of remuneration that maximizes their joint welfare.
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“[Flying by private jet] is like heroin: it's so good, you shouldn't even try it once. But this
is what the life of top executives of public companies is like—not only in air travel, but in
terms of limos and hotel suites and never waiting in lines and getting courtside tickets to
N.B.A. games and never having to worry about how much anything costs because the
1
shareholders are paying for it all.”—Ben Stein

I.

Introduction
Corporate perks and greed are bad, so says the conventional wisdom. They are, at

the best, inefficient motivators, and, at the worst, they enable and encourage theft of
shareholder property. This view is widely shared by academics in economics, business,
and law, as well as prosecutors, the media, and the public at large. According to the
mainstream view, the perquisites and obscene spending habits of investment bankers or
CEOs of public companies are evidence of a failure of corporate governance and
government regulation, and proof of the rot and waste of corporate America. In the
1

Ben Stein, Climbing Above It All (in a Private Jet, of Course), N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, § 3, at 5.
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academic lingo: high levels of noncash compensation are often viewed as evidence of
large agency costs within a firm, and justification for regulation or corporate governance
reforms. The recent cover of Forbes magazine summed up the prevailing attitude: “Have
They No Shame? How Self-Dealing Fat Cats Still Dump on Investors.”2
Prosecutors have attempted to capitalize on this view in recent high-profile
corporate fraud cases. For example, in the trial of Dennis Kozlowski, former chief
executive of Tyco, evidence of Kozlowski’s lavish lifestyle and exorbitant expenditures,
often purchased with company money but for his benefit, took center stage. A $15,000
poodle-shaped umbrella stand, a $6,000 shower curtain for the maid’s bathroom, a $2
million birthday bacchanalia in Sardinia replete with loin-cloth clad Roman “slaves” and
an ice-sculpture of Michelangelo’s David urinating liquor—you name it, at some point
Kozlowski purchased it, or, rather, Kozlowski had Tyco purchase it, or lend him the
money to do so.3 The intended implication of all this profligate consumption, from the
prosecution’s point of view, was that Tyco was a company out of shareholders’ control
but firmly in Kozlowski’s pocket, and open to his machinations, expropriation, and
abuse.4 The fact that these purchases were extravagances on which Kozlowski would not
have spent his own money was meant to illustrate their unreasonableness, and to make it
appear more likely that, later on when Kozlowski was granted hundreds of millions of
dollars in cash compensation and loan forgiveness, this was an act of corporate looting by
an insatiable, out-of-control glutton. The repulsion at this corporate greed was not
confined to the courtroom, but permeated subsequent academic accounts as well: as one
commentator recently stated, “[t]he Sardinian soiree serves as a fitting emblem of what
will likely be remembered as one of the greatest periods of corporate excess in American
history.”5
So, exorbitant lifestyles and company perks can carry a negative implication in
the minds of jurors investigating alleged fraud after-the-fact, helping to establish “guilt

2

Elizabeth MacDonald, Crony Capitalism, FORBES, June 21, 2004, at 140-6.
See Mark Maremont, Executives on Trial: Next Evidence for Kozlowski Jurors: The Party Video, WALL
STREET J., October 28, 2003, at C1; Colleen DeBaise, Executives on Trial: Newest 'Tyco Gone Wild' Video
Is Out, And Jurors See $6,000 Shower Curtain, WALL STREET J., November 26, 2003, at C1; D. Polek, The
Rise and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, Businessweek 12/32/02 at 64
4
See id.
5
Note, Developments in the Law – Corporations and Society, 117 HAR. L. REV. 2169, 2173-74 (2004).
3
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by ostentation.”6 At least, this is what the prosecution in such cases hopes.7 Corporate
reformers—in the academy, at pension funds, in Congress, and at the SEC—also took the
negative view of corporate loans and perks in the wake of the recent corporate scandals,
believing that they were the symptom of a larger corporate governance disease. But is
this the correct implication? There is a competing vision of corporate “excess” that we
still see, even in the post-Enron world. The Wall Street Journal occasionally carries
reports, when economic times are good, of lavish expenditures by successful executives
and investment bankers, such as a Learjet stocked with Jack Daniel’s and Cookie Crisp to
fly with friends to the Super Bowl, a wedding at the Palace of Versailles, or, of course,
the usual Ferraris, Porsches, and Roll-Royces.8 And when times turn bad, the Journal
strikes a tone of lamentation as perks and conspicuous consumption decline.9 Overall,
there is bemused approval of excess, rather than puritanical disdain. While it easy to
dismiss these articles as appealing to the ego of Wall Streeters or the voyeuristic interests
of the masses, they contain, perhaps, an appreciation that such conspicuous consumption
is a barometer of a well-functioning economy, and that corporate jets and one-thousand
dollar bottles of wine are important parts of the compensation mix for high-powered
individuals. While we might not go so far as to accept the unqualified maxim of Gordon
Gecko (Ivan Boesky’s fictionalized alter-ego) that “greed is good,”10 there does seem to
be an extent to which the desire on the part of some individuals to accumulate wealth in
order to enjoy prodigious amounts of consumption is socially beneficial. After all, why
else would anyone ever work the hours required of investment banking or corporate law
6

See Stephen Bainbridge, Guilt by Ostentation, available at http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
2004/04/guilt_by_ostent.html
7
This certainly appears to be the case in the Stewart and Kozlowski trials. See Leslie Eaton, Web of
Friends and Business Blurs Stewart’s Glossy Image, N.Y. TIMES, February 29, 2004, at __; Alex Berenson,
Overcompensating: In Fraud Cases, Guilt Can Be Skin Deep, N.Y. TIMES, February 29, 2004, at __. See
also Barry Meier, Looking to Add a Bit of Glamour to Adelphia Trial, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2004, at __
(describing the prosecution’s attempts to show the Rigas family greedily used Adelphia resources for their
own purposes, such as chartering the corporate jet to transport a Christmas tree).
8
See Gregory Zuckerman & Cassell Bryan-Low, With the Market Up, Wall Street High Life Bounces Back,
Too, WALL STREET J., February 4, 2004, at A1. Similar pieces over the years: Patrick McGeehan, Now
Suddenly Rich, Wall Streeters Spark a Very Fancy Boom, WALL STREET J., April 10, 1997 at A1; George
Anders, Paul Blustein & Patricia Bellew Gray, Inside Wall Street: Merger Whiz Kids: Wall Street Prodigies
Seek Money and Power as They Build Careers, WALL STREET J., June 2, 1986, at __.
9
See Anita Raghavan, Nickel and Dimed: Wall Street Sweats the Small Stuff, WALL STREET J., October 27,
2003, at A1; Wrin White & Teri Agins, Sellers of Big Ticket Items Brace for Less Splurging, WALL STREET
J., October 2, 2001, at B1; Mitchell Pacelle, Wendy Bounds, & Suein L. Hwang, The Market Bounceback:
When Stocks Shimmy, New York Shakes, WALL STREET J., October 29, 1997, at __.
10
WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1985).
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if not to spend the occasional forty-five minutes of free time savoring a five hundred
dollar lunch at Le Bernardin?
Branching off from that basic intuition, we explore how perks, corporate loans,
and conspicuous consumption may actually work in the firm’s best interest. We believe
that, by reducing employee savings, these compensation mechanisms allow the firm to
reduce agency costs and maximize the value of the employment relationship: they forcefeed the employee consumption, at the expense of savings, which fosters dependence
upon the firm and subjects the employee to the threat of retaliation for misbehavior in the
future. More specifically, a reduction in savings makes the employee a “repeat player,”
and can therefore deter “cheating”—actions by the employee that enrich her while
harming her employer—while also improving employee retention.
Consider, first, an employee who saves her money: savings enables the employee
to retire or downshift her career to a less high-powered industry where her reputation may
not follow her.11 With enough savings, the employee no longer cares whether she remains
employed or not, rendering toothless the firm’s chief incentivization tool, the ability to
fire the employee and blackball her from future employment. When savings is great
enough, there is no reason not to cheat: with enough savings in hand, the employee
simply does not care whether she is fired and blackballed from other firms; she has
become immune to reputational constraints on her behavior.12 In these cases, the
employee and her firm face a “final period problem,” where the employee has no
incentive to refrain from cheating. This can destroy much of the surplus from the
employment relationship.
So what should the firm do? We argue that the firm will do what it can to reduce
employee savings, and we identify several mechanisms for reducing savings that firms
actually utilize, which either reduce the amount of cash the employee receives on the
front end, or else, on the back end, increase the employee’s spending and consumption.
On the front end, the firm has essentially two choices: first, payment in deferred cash,
better known as corporate loans, and, second, payment via in-kind transfers, better known
as perks. Deferred compensation, such as loans that will be forgiven in the future if the
11

For example, if an investment banker saves enough wealth to retire to the Bahamas, her reputation in the
investment banking world simply does not matter to her any more.
12
In Wall Street patois, this is referred to as “fuck-you money.”
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firm determines that the employee has not cheated, provides a useful carrot and stick to
deter cheating, but has limitations because of difficulties in observing and verifying
outcomes and in drafting and enforcing complete contracts.13 Perks, on the other hand,
are not subject to limits on the ability to contract, since they involve simply the transfer
of a good or service, along with the firm’s ability to fire. For example, front-row Knicks
tickets are used up right away, and an employee who receives them in lieu of some
amount of cash will not, ceteris paribus, be able to save as much, making her more
dependent on the firm into the future. Perks have the advantage of leveraging upon the
firm’s ability to fire at will the misbehaving employee; no contract is required. As with
deferred cash, there is a limit to how cost effective perks can be, since employees will
always (absent the productivity, status, and tax considerations discussed in Part II) prefer
cash to the same dollar amount of perks.
On the back end, firms have several strategies at their disposal to encourage their
employees to save less or desire more. First, the firm can invest in hiring-stage sorting,
attempting to identify and hire employees with a high degree of enjoyment for money and
consumption—that is, firms will look for “greedy” people. Second, by plying them with
perks, the firm can inculcate in its employees a taste for luxury and high consumption, so
that employees become “addicted” to increasingly more expensive lifestyles—the famed
“golden handcuffs.” Third, a firm can “force” employees to consume at higher levels
through signaling games, where the employee signals her loyalty to the firm by spending
her wage in a certain way.
One might (and we do) make an analogy to drug dependency: the employee who
consumes all her resources immediately enjoys large present utility, but is ultimately
dependent upon the firm to provide her with the opportunity to enjoy similar
consumption in the future. It is as though the employee were paid with heroin rather than
with cash: all the employee’s resources are converted into immediate utility, leaving the
employee wanting more as soon as the current round of consumption wears off. The
source of her next “fix,” of course, is her employer, and so she lives hand-to-mouth and

13

As discussed herein, a deferred compensation arrangement is essentially a contract between the firm and
employee that states that the employee will refrain from cheating in the future. Deferred compensation
arrangements are thus subject to limits on the ability to draft and enforce contracts.
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remains dependent upon the firm from one period to another.14 The addictive quality of
these compensation mechanisms is value-adding: greedy employees are (somewhat
counter-intuitively) more trustworthy than ascetic ones, as the desire for high
consumption motivates performance and loyalty in demanding or unpleasant jobs that no
one would persist at for long.
Thus, “outrageous” perks and spending habits may be signs of a well-functioning
labor market for high-valued employees, not necessarily misappropriation of shareholder
resources or shortcomings of character; in contrast, a high level of cash compensation and
savings may suggest sub-optimal incentivization packages, and can be symptomatic of
executive over-reaching. In other words, what is commonly believed to be evidence of
large agency costs is actually an effective way to reduce the agency costs inevitable in
the modern American firm. Counter to the mainstream media and academic accounts,
high levels of corporate loans, in-kind compensation, and extravagant consumption may
be evidence of optimal incentivization, where principal and agent have contracted
(explicitly or implicitly) for just the amount and type of remuneration that maximizes
their joint welfare.
Applying this theoretical framework to the real world can help explain much of
the observable behavior and practice in high-compensation and high-variable pay
industries (such as upper corporate management, investment banking, and corporate law),
and can also help to distinguish between “good” and “bad” compensation practices.
Furthermore, we argue that these beneficial forms of compensation may in fact be
significantly underprovided from a social welfare perspective, since reduced savings
deters not just present period cheating but also past and future cheating at other firms,
leading individual firms to free-ride. Thus, while perks, corporate loans, and conspicuous
consumption are not without their downsides, there are valid arguments for granting them
favored treatment.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part II briefly surveys the existing literature on
perks and conspicuous consumption, including a discussion of the possible productivity,
organizational, and tax benefits of perks that has, heretofore, largely been absent from the
14

There is, of course, a dark side to drug addiction, and we believe there may, similarly, be a negative side
to perks and conspicuous consumption. We discuss these and address normative concerns in a later part of
the paper.
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legal literature. This Part broadly addresses all types of perks—including run-of-the-mill,
nonextravagant perks—many of which are provided for reasons other than to reduce
savings and buttress reputational constraints. We include discussion of these perks, which
are only somewhat related to our core argument, to provide a more comprehensive
treatment of the general subject of perks, which is highly negative and one-sided in the
existing literature. Focusing more narrowly on the core puzzle we try to solve, Part III
describes potential weaknesses in the reputation constraint in certain industries where
effort and quality are not immediately observable, and illustrates how high levels of
savings may lead to final period problems and increased agency costs. Part IV explores
how in-kind compensation and corporate loans can be used to prevent reputational
failings caused by high savings, as well as how prehire sorting, inculcation of
preferences, and signaling via corporate culture can further align the incentives of firm
and employee. Part V discusses normative implications of this theory, including the dark
side of “corporate heroin” and appropriate policy reforms. Part VI concludes.

II.

The Conventional Wisdom
A.

The Critics

The prevailing wisdom among corporate observers is that perks are bad
(especially “excessive” perks, although “excessive” isn’t typically defined). There are
two primary objections. The first is that the separation of ownership and control—the
classic “agency problem”15—allows greedy executives to steal from the cookie jar while
diffuse and distant shareholders remain indifferent or unable to stop them. In this view of
the world, perks are an example of “stealthy” compensation that shareholders have more
difficulty observing or preventing, and therefore high levels of perks suggests weak
corporate governance.16 The second objection is that perks are inefficient and perhaps
counterproductive incentives for employees.
15

Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations first described the different and conflicting incentives of
ownership and management. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, ___ (____). The modern theory
was extended by the work of Berle and Means, see ADOLF BERLE & GARNIDER MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, ___ (1932), and Jensen and Meckling, see Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,
3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 305-360 (1976).
16
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9813, at 10-11 (July 2003), available at
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To the first point, most academic discussions of employment incentives cast perks
in a highly negative light. A quick search of legal journals on WESTLAW yields over
100 articles in the past three years discussing perks, and all of these articles view perks as
evidence of, at best, an unavoidable, value-destroying cost of the corporate form with its
separation of ownership and control, and, at worst, managerial misbehavior. George
Triantis describes the weak form of criticism as an agency problem, with perks being
evidence of inevitable slippage in the corporate gears: “Managers enjoy private benefits
[in the form of perquisites] that are not shared by other investors because of their control
over decisionmaking.”17 Lucian Bebchuk and Christine Jolls extend this thinking a bit,
claiming that perks are presumptively evidence of high agency costs because executives
often “provide themselves with various perks not germane to their responsibilities.”18
Likewise, Harvard Business School professor Brian Hall links perks and waste: “Without
incentives tied to shareholder value creation . . ., top executives may face stronger
incentives to . . . purchase excessive perquisites that are privately beneficial but valuedestroying (to both society and shareholders).”19 The accepted wisdom is that perks “are
attractive to management but are of no interest to shareholders” and in fact are “value
destroying.”20
A more strident criticism—the managerial misbehavior view—surfaced recently
in the wake of the allegation of spectacular fraud at Enron, WorldCom, and several other
firms. Dozens of recent legal articles have itemized a litany of alleged corporate excesses
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9813 (noting that the grounds for offering perks are unclear, and that the
primary purpose is “to make [the amount of executive] pay less salient.”).
17
George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms,
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, __ HARV. L. REV. __ (2004).
18
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 487, 487-8 (1999).
19
Brian J. Hall, Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure, HAR. BUS. REV.
Reprint 9-902-134, 12 (Oct. 11, 2002).
20
____, Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoiding Illusory Terms in Venture Capital, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L., 1, 27
n. 69 (2003). A recent empirical study by David Yermack concludes that “CEOs’ personal use of company
aircraft is associated with severe and significant under-performance of their employers’ stocks.” David
Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, at 3,
unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=529822. Yermack
conjectures that “these managers run their firms inefficiently, tolerating waste, excess overhead, or
uncompetitive cost structures.” An alternative interpretation of his result is, we think, that granting the CEO
use of the corporate jet is an attempt by the compensation committee to address a potential cheating
problem that looms on the horizon, which the perk is an attempt to ward off. The fact that perks are
correlated with the potential for cheating does not mean that perks cause the problem, just as it would be
incorrect to conclude that the administration of medicine is symptomatic (or even causative) of a disease.
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at these firms, and presented this as evidence of a kind of rot rampant in American
corporate governance. The picture these scholars paint is one of greedy CEOs motivated
by pure self-interest and focused more on creating a lavish lifestyle for themselves than
shareholder value. A recent article tellingly entitled “Are Corporations Evil?,” makes the
typical academic link between perks and fraud: “The particulars of each case are unique,
but certain elements remain constant [including] outrageous perks for insiders . . ..”21 The
search for causes of frauds at Enron, WorldCom, and other firms is a cottage industry
whose main output seems to be what could only be described normatively as an antigreed view of corporations. For example, John Coffee blames Enron’s downfall on the
moral and ethical lapses of management, calling the culture infused with “infectious
greed.”22 And the most comprehensive treatment of the Enron bankruptcy blames
Enron’s collapse on “a culture of excess,” evidenced by “a fleet of corporate jets,
limousines . . ., and . . . concierge [services].”23 None of these articles examines perks in
depth or offers any potential counter arguments as to why they might be evidence of a
rationally efficient employment contract.
The ineffectiveness of perks is another popular refrain in the academic literature,
although this argument is found primarily in the management and finance journals. The
main argument here is that perks “typically undermine the very processes they are
intended to enhance”24 by creating employees who are primarily motivated by their own
interests and are subjected to (supposedly) hostile environments of reward and
punishment. This view is premised on the belief that rewards and punishment are
different sides of the same coin, and that the use of perks creates “a workplace in which
people feel controlled,” and “that experience of being controlled is likely to assume a
punitive quality over time.”25 Perks are typically referred to as “bribes,” and critics point
to anecdotal evidence suggesting that companies suffer a backlash from incentive-rich

21

Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, __ UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. __ (2004).
John C. Coffee Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 269-71 (2003).
23
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON, 122-3 (2003).
24
Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work, HAR. BUS. REV., Reprint 93506, 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1993).
25
Id at 5.
22
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environments.26 Rather bleakly, these scholars describe perk-rich companies as plagued
by “a hoard of incentive-driven individuals trying to curry favor with the incentive
dispenser,” and predict doom—or at least under- or improperly motivated employees.27
Here again, the implication is that greed is bad, and that perks and conspicuous
consumption are prima facie evidence of high agency costs or some sort of corporate
mismanagement or wrongdoing.28
The typical solution offered by these scholars involves linking pay to seniority29
or other group-based metrics30 or a focus on “intrinsic human motivations,” with fuzzy
concepts like “[s]atisfaction and respect” being the best incentives for high
performance.31 Compensation experts offer vague recipes for motivation, such as Alfie
Kohn’s “Three C’s” framework: choice, collaboration, and content, with a focus on
“empowering” workers and creating a “happy” work environment, or rely on inchoate
notions of “‘enlightened’ self-restraint of managers” or “strong ethical norms.”32 These
proposed solutions turn Adam Smith’s suggestion to rely on the self interest (not the
benevolence) of the butcher or the baker33 on its head:
[T]he corporation's reward structure, or individual self-interest, should not
be perceived as the prime employee motivator. . . . While individual selfinterest is a given, the institutional structure of the corporation should

26

Colloquy, Rethinking Rewards, HARV. BUS. REV., Reprint 93610, 7 (Nov.-Dec. 1993) (“But the more
they [give] you, the more they think they own you.”).
27
Id at 6. See also EDWARD DECI & RICHARD RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN
HUMAN BEHAVIOR, __ (1985).
28
A few legal articles express a sort of puzzlement at the size and scope of perks typical in corporate
America. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEO’s Bargain For?: An Empirical
Study of Legal Components of CEO Employment Contracts, Vanderbilt Law & Economics Working Paper
No.
04-12,
unpublished
manuscript
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=529923. Schwab and Thomas describe the litany of perks in CEO employment contracts – such
as use of company aircraft, country club memberships, and company cars – and then express their disbelief
that CEOs need any perks at all: “Given the very large amounts of money that these executives already earn
for their efforts, we are surprised that companies are willing to offer them such a wide range of perqs [sic]
of this nature.” Id at __.
29
This is, in fact, a deferred compensation mechanism, as we describe in Part IV.A.
30
See, for example, Egon Zehner, A Simpler Way to Pay, HARV. BUS. REV., 3-9 (Apr. 2001) (describing
how seniority-based pay at large consulting firm reduced turnover to 2% compared with industry average
of 30%).
31
Colloquy, Rethinking Rewards, HARV. BUS. REV., Reprint 93610, 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1993).
32
Brian J. Hall, Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Reprint 9-902-134, 11 (Oct. 11, 2002) (“[S]trong ethical norms and behaviors represent an important and
powerful check on necessarily imperfectly designed and enforced incentive schemes.”).
33
See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, ___ (____) (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest.”).
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encourage and validate an attitude of caring for the corporation's
stakeholders and persons affected by the corporation's decisions.34
No plan to change human nature to achieve enlightened benevolence is typically
offered.35
Similarly, the sort of conspicuous consumption—even when purchased on the
employee’s own dime—that we discuss in this paper has not been well-regarded in the
legal journals or case law.36 The grotesquely inflated appetite of high-powered
individuals for extravagant consumption is usually regarded as crossing the line from
legitimate self-interest into myopic greed.37 In a survey of “greed” in the case law, Eric
Posner recounts that courts, while recognizing that some degree of greed may be useful
and necessary to a well-functioning market,38 regard gluttonous, short-sighted behavior of
the sort in which corporate CEOs and Wall Street securities professionals regularly
indulge as undermining capitalism in general.39 In short, “[c]apitalism needs moderation,
not excess, . . . self-interest, not greed.”40 Lynn Stout goes even farther, arguing that
purely self-interested actors, without the behavioral checks of ingrained altruism, will
ultimately lead to the collapse of the cooperative venture that is the modern business
corporation.41 Like Brian Hall’s call for “enlightened self-restraint of managers,” Stout
concludes that while “[p]ersonal payoffs count,” the “solution” to corporate ills is
34

Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and
Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, __ (2004).
35
Alan Greenspan proposes what seems like a more reasonable solution to the problem he labeled
“infectious greed,” one that recognizes human nature and accords well with the argument we develop in
this article. Greenspan wrote: “Although we may not be able to change the character of corporate officers,
we can change behavior through incentives and penalties.” Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary
Policy Report to Congress, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, (July 16,
2002) (testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/hh/2002/july/testimony.htm.
36
Perks are rarely discussed in federal or state cases. Perks are occasionally mentioned in cases in which
levels of executive compensation are challenged, but not often and only as throwaway color when included.
In fact, the most famous executive compensation challenges in the past few years don’t mention perks at
all. See, for example, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del.Ch. 2003). And even when perks are mentioned, they don’t warrant separate
legal analysis but rather are included in the analysis of total compensation under doctrines of corporate
waste. Perks are more commonly mentioned in divorce cases, but only with respect to divvying the largess.
37
See Eric Posner, The Jurisprudence of Greed, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1099-1100 (2003).
38
For instance, Judge Frank Easterbrook has praised greed as “the engine that propels the market
economy,” and “the basis of Smithian market-economics.” Id. at 1103, 1130
(citations omitted).
39
See id at 1100-2, 1132.
40
Id at 1132.
41
See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003).
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“character.”42 A veritable legion of academic and general media articles pile on, sounding
a chorus of condemnation of the perceived “infectious greed”43 that led to the downfall of
companies such as Enron, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen, and Tyco.44
Finally, we would note that it is not just perks and conspicuous consumption that
have come under fire, but also a prominent form of deferred compensation: corporate
loans to employees. Corporate loans come in essentially two flavors: first, subsidized
loans that are often earmarked for some sort of expenditure, such as purchase of a house,
car, or company stock, and, second, loans available for any use that may be forgiven by
the firm in the future, at the firm’s discretion. Critics have contended that such loans
cannot be efficient since a bank’s cost of borrowing would be lower than that of the
firm,45 and that such loans are intended to hide compensation from shareholders, as the
economic consequence of the loans are not disclosed in way investors can readily
understand, and because the loans are often forgiven by the firm later on.46 Firms and
regulators completely ignored this criticism, however, until the apparent abuse of
corporate loans took a central role in the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and
others. To take just one example, evidence at the fraud trial of former Tyco CEO Dennis
Kozlowski showed he received subsidized loans totaling tens of millions of dollars,
including $33 million for homes, $15 million for home furnishings, $13 million to buy a
yacht, and $5 million for a diamond ring.47 The outrage at these apparently indefensible
42

Id at 25.
See Floyd Norris, Yes, He Can Top That, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A1 (noting that Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan observed that: “An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business
community.”).
44
See, for example, John C. Coffee Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History of
the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 269-71 (2003); BARBARA LEY TOFFLER WITH JENNIFER REINGOLD,
FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN (Broadway Books 2003);
John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle: How the Financial System Encouraged Corporations to Go Crazy, THE
NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 64-77; ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF
ENRON 12 (2002); BRIAN CRUVER, ANATOMY OF GREED: THE UNSHREDDED TRUTH FROM AN ENRON
INSIDER (2002); David Streitfeld & Lee Romney, Enron's Run Tripped by Arrogance, Greed; Profile: A
Lack of Discipline and a Drive to Bend the Rules Were Key Factors in the Meltdown, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2002, at A22.
45
See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2003) (criticizing corporate loans at reduced interest rates).
46 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9813, at 10-11 (July 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9813 (criticizing loans as “stealth compensation” due in part to inadequacies
of disclosure).
47 See Mark Maremont, Kara Scannell & Charles Forelle, Executives on Trial: Mistrial
Scuttles Possible Guilty Verdicts in Tyco Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2004 at A1.
43
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excesses (we will offer a defense in Section IV below) grew to the point where President
George W. Bush called for an end to corporate loans at a speech at the New York Stock
Exchange, and an anti-corporate loan provision was quickly added to the pending
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act now specifically
prohibits loans to executive officers of public companies.48
B.

The Supporters

There is some weak support in the literature for perks, with a few management
scholars noting the important role of in-kind compensation when it comes to paying the
“market wage” for particular employees. For example, Jeffrey Pfeffer of the Stanford
Business School uses the case example of the company SAS Institute Inc. to show the
retention power of perks and to debunk the myth that money is the most effective way to
motivate employees. Pfeffer notes that SAS, the world’s largest privately held software
company, has achieved an industry low turnover rate of four percent by offering
employees, inter alia, “a family-friendly environment that features exceptional
benefits.”49 In fact, SAS’s employees attribute the low turnover to the motivation
provided by the firm’s “unique perks,” such as on-site schools, day care, and doctors, as
well as free meals cooked by famous gourmet chefs.50 While we echo this analysis, these
perks are much less controversial and serve a different purpose than the anti-savings,
extravagant perks we defend in Part IV.
In addition, recent empirical work by Raghuram Rajan and Julie Wulf suggests
that while “perks may be a form of excess” in some firms, “the blanket indictment of the
use of perks is unwarranted” because they serve shareholder interests, since perks may, in
some instances, increase productivity, avoid taxes, or play an important behavioral role in
defining hierarchies.51 Rajan and Wulf also call into question any alleged linkage
between “excessive” perks and bad corporate governance. Their study uses regressions of
numerous firm variables (size, location, org structure, productivity) against three
common perks (company plane, chauffer service, and club memberships), to conclude
48

See nn. 141 to 151, infra, discussing treatment of corporate loans over time.
Jeffrey Pfeffer, Six Dangerous Myths About Pay, HARV. BUS. REV., Reprint 98309, 110-11 (May-Jun.
1998). In this way, SAS has created a modern day company town that effectively captures employees and
makes them dependent on the firm for essential services.
50
Id at 116.
51
See Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?, NBER Working Paper
Series, Working Paper 10494, at 2-8 (May 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10494.
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that there is “no direct relationship” between measures of governance and access to these
perks.52 This recent analysis is broader and more favorable to perks than most work in
this area, but it falls short of explaining fully the use of extravagant perks that are not
justified on grounds of increased productivity, cultural signals, or taxes.
Articles in support of perks (or even simply offering alternative explanations) are
quite rare in the legal literature, which makes it worth recounting here some of the
standard arguments (along with some augmentations) in favor of routine, nonextravagant
perks. From an employer perspective, there are at least three major benefits of providing
perks (beside the argument we describe in Parts III and IV below). First, there is the
ability of a firm to capture value marginal benefits from perks that exceed their costs and
that it wouldn’t capture if the buying decision were left to the employee. For example, a
firm may benefit more from providing first-class airfare—so that an executive arrives
fresh for an important meeting—than would the executive, who might pay for economy if
forced to pay his own way.53 This same logic applies to a whole range of perks, from
health insurance and gym memberships (to promote healthy employees) to parties and
sporting tickets (to foster esprit de corps or capture the innovation benefits possible from
mixing different parts of an organization together).
A second potential benefit is the ability to create or signal (internally and/or
externally) a specific organization structure. Perks enable firms to foster a hierarchal or
flat organization in ways that compensation cannot because perks are generally more
observable than salaries to other employees.54 A firm looking to foster a collegial
atmosphere might provide the same fringe benefits to all employees (like free massages
or on-site doctors) while firms trying to reinforce a chain of command or create an
internal tournament for top jobs might offer lavish perks only to top executives. One
reason a successful firm might have an executive dining room and fly its top executives
around the world on a fleet of private jets is because of the informational signals these
perks send to employees, the labor market, and to other firms.55 Firms might also use
52

See id at 25.
Id at __.
54
See, for example, FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS OF GROWTH, __ (1976) (noting how perks can serve an
important organizational role as a status or positional good).
55
Another example of this, writ small, is the practice at Merrill Lynch of assigning separate models of
chairs to employees based upon rank. An associate of the authors, then a lowly analyst at Merrill, had his
53
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particular types of perks to create or reinforce a particular firm culture.56 In this way,
perks can help create a firm culture that can be transmitted throughout the organization
through the use of stories. According to management gurus Tom Peters and Robert
Waterman, “the dominance and coherence of culture proved to be an essential quality of .
. . excellent companies,” and cultures are created largely through the use of “story” and
“legend.”57 On the other hand, firms that want to emphasis egalitarian values such as
equality, teamwork, and collegiality (perhaps because of the relative importance of the
rank and file or a more horizontal management structure) do so also through the
regulation of perks. Some firms openly brag about the lavishness of their perks (in order
to create one type of culture) while others take pride in austerity (to achieve the opposite
culture).58
The third potential employer benefit is the ability to tailor the firm’s
compensation mix to attract and retain employees with particular traits. For example, a
firm looking to hire more women could offer on-site day care facilities or concierge
services in lieu of or in addition to cash compensation. Likewise, an investment firm
trying to attract greedy, money-focused employees could offer lavish offices, parties, and
lifestyles. This powerful tool allows firms to sort according to certain characteristics in
ways that paying cash cannot. This is because cash—the ultimate commodity—can
convey only one signal from the firm. To combat this informational weakness of cash,

chair removed and mothballed, and an analyst’s chair purchased for him, when human resources discovered
he was sitting on, in fact, a vice-president’s chair.
56
For example, Enron created its culture in part by sending executives on a 1200-mile jeep/dirt bike road
race through Mexico. According to Enron employees, “[t]hese trips entered Enron lore, serving as a symbol
of the company’s macho, risk-taking culture.” BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN
THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON, 122 (2003). While in hindsight Enron’s
culture appears to have led it to take at least one risk too many, the point is that perks are a powerful way to
create and sustain corporate culture, be it good or bad.
57
THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE, 75 (Warner Books
1984). While in hindsight Enron’s culture appears to have led it to take at least one risk too many, the point
is that perks are a powerful way to create and sustain corporate culture, be it good or bad.
58
For example, Intel proudly reports that the “CEO works in a cubicle,” that there are “no reserved parking
spaces,” that there is no executive dining room, and that “executives fly coach.” See Robert Levering &
Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies to Work For, 141 FORTUNE, ___, 2000, at 83; Robert Levering
& Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies to Work For, 147 FORTUNE, Jan. 20, 2003, at 127.
Similarly, a former Enron executive who now heads KinderMorgan, recently said that providing perks to
senior executives “sends the wrong signals” to the other employees and the shareholders. See Joann S.
Lublin, Cheap, Cheap, Cheap: The CEO of a Houston Pipeline Company Talks About His Low-Cost
Approach to Executive Compensation, WALL STREET J., Apr. 12, 2004, at R11.
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firms may choose to offer in-kind compensation that is replete with information from the
firm about what is valued.59
There are also several potential benefits to employees that aren’t readily apparent
from reading the academic literature or media reports. First, an employee’s subjective
value for a particular perk may, in some cases, be greater than the cost of a perk. This
could be due simply to economies of scale or greater bargaining leverage, but perks may
have an additional psychic value to the employee—an “ego premium”—that represents
the utility the recipient gets from feeling important or appreciated. Anyone who has
worked at a big city law firm or investment bank knows that it is cool to have a black
Town Car waiting to swift you off to whatever destination you specify, and it is even
better when friends and acquaintances can see you get out at your destination. A former
senior executive at Enron described it this way: “I used to walk off the company plane
after being picked up and being dropped off by limousine, and I’d have to remind myself
that I was a real human being.”60 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this “ego premium” is
fairly inelastic to wealth. Mega-millionaire Martha Stewart routinely submitted receipts
to be reimbursed by her firm for miniscule expenses, such as coffee and limo trips.
Clearly the administrative cost to Stewart (even if she was simply giving receipts to her
assistant for processing) exceeds the marginal financial benefit to her, so an ego premium
of sorts may well have made up the difference.61 Our interviews with CEOs and
executive headhunters corroborate this potential benefit of perks and its importance to
even wealthy executives. A leading executive recruiter believes that “recognition” is a
primary motivator for high-powered individuals, and that it is “the trappings of high
corporate office” that keep many wealthy corporate executives from flying the coop.
“These [executives] have all the money they can spend—what they want, and can’t get in
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For example, Patagonia, the maker of outdoor equipment for the “crunchy” set, signals to the labor
market the type of employees it wants by offering employees “training in civil disobedience,” “$2000 to
subsidize the purchase of a hybrid vehicle,” and “organic food in the cafeteria.” Robert Levering & Milton
Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies to Work For, 145 FORTUNE, Feb. 4, 2002, at 72. It would be hard for
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60
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON, 123 (2003).
61
Interestingly, for most of the time Stewart submitted these expenses, she owned a significant part of the
firm, so she bore more of the cost of the perks than the average CEO.
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retirement, is the corner office, the attractive secretary, the limos, expense accounts, and
corporate jets.”62
Another benefit for an employee is the ability to satisfy preferences that are
repressed by the particular “mental accounting” of an individual. Mental accounting is
the heuristic whereby people may partition money on an intuitive level, mentally setting
aside some money to pay bills, some for retirement, some for instant gratification, and so
on.63 According to this school of thought, the primary reason people engage in mental
accounting is to impose “financial self-control.”64 Perks may have particular value
because they are a convenient way of getting around this safety valve and exercising real
but repressed preferences. For example, one may value a free $100 meal as much (or
even more than) $100 in cash because it is something one wouldn’t otherwise buy given
the restrictions of self-imposed mental accounting. Furthermore, we would point out that
there is a more tangible benefit as well: the employee, who would otherwise have to share
income with her spouse, family, or creditors, does not have to share her perks with them.
There are also tax benefits to perks. Although perks are technically considered
“income” within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, exceptions for “de minimis”
perks (such as business meals, entertainment, and athletic facilities)

65

and generous

exclusions for employer-provided health insurance and pension contributions swallows
the rule for most employees.66 Because of the tax breaks, in-kind compensation can be
preferable to an equivalent amount of cash. For instance, $100 in perks could
theoretically be equivalent to $167 in cash for an employee in the 40 percent tax
bracket.67 As tax rates increase, one would expect the rate of substitution to increase.
Anecdotally, this is what we see when comparing the level of perks in countries with low
62

Interview with corporate headhunter conducted by authors on July 11, 2004.
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ANALYSIS OF LAW, 288, 294 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 2000).
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ed., 2000).
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tax rates (like America) and high rates (like Europe): European executives enjoy more
fringe benefits than their American counterparts.68 So tax breaks may drive a significant
proportion of perks, especially the nonextravagant perks discussed in this Part.69
These several benefits are considerable. But as we will discuss in Parts III and IV,
these justifications—increased productivity, informational benefits, and tax avoidance—
do not fully explain the common use of extravagant perks often pilloried in the academic
literature and public accounts. Extravagant perks—like large corporate loans or liberal
use of corporate jets—are instead used because of their ability to incentivize good, firmdependent behavior by making reputation work better through avoidance of final period
cheating problems.

III.

How Savings Causes the Failure of Reputation
Even without the potential productivity and tax advantages discussed in the

preceding Part, we would argue that perks, corporate loans, and conspicuous
consumption provide a useful benefit by helping to minimize agency costs. This
argument runs counter to the prevailing intuition that such perks are a symptom (or even
a cause) of an agency problem, not its potential cure. As we will discuss in this Part, cash
compensation enables employees to save. At a certain level of saved wealth, the
employee is no longer reliant upon the firm, which allows two bad things to happen from
the firm’s (and perhaps society’s) perspective: the employee can leave the industry, and
the employee becomes immune to the firm’s ability to penalize her through firing and
blackballing for cheating.

68

See Towers Perrin 1998 Worldwide Total Rewards Study (concluding that in-kind compensation makes
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19

A.

Savings, Cheating, and Retention

Firms rely on reputation to enforce good behavior where complete monitoring is
impracticable or where complete contracts are difficult to write and enforce. For example,
a client may rely on its investment banker’s reputation for doing “good deals” when it
obtains advice from the investment banker about whether a certain acquisition would be
advisable. Because oftentimes the efficacy of an acquisition is not revealed until long
after completion (and, even then, it may be impossible or prohibitively costly to say with
finality whether the outcome was due to a poor acquisition or intervening factors), it may
be impossible for the client to monitor the investment banker’s level of effort, or to draft
a contract that properly aligns the investment banker’s incentives with the client’s. Since
the banker gets paid only in the event that a deal goes through, the client might suppose
that a banker would always push even a bad deal ahead, which could lead the client to
never enter into a relationship with the banker in the first place.
In such a case, then, the client may look to the investment banker’s past record of
success (or failure) in deciding whether to retain that investment banker. If the banker has
a history of good deals, or satisfied customers, as revealed over time (i.e., a good
reputation), the client will be more likely to deal with the banker.70 The investment
banker, realizing this, will make an investment in her reputation by foregoing immediate
gains, if necessary, in order to achieve higher long term profits. Essentially, the banker is
a repeat player, and her reputation will follow her into the future even if clients are not
repeat players; thus, the banker has an incentive not to cheat in each iteration of the
game.71 Reputation allows the agent to bond herself to act in the principal’s interest.72
70

Firm reputation may be as important or more important in these decisions, but this doesn’t change the
analysis. It simply moves the burden to judge reputation from the client to the firm.
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The importance of reputation is illustrated by the way firms with highly paid employees, like investment
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This view of reputation is, however, premised on one assumption that is likely to
be faulty: in order for reputation to constrain the employee’s behavior, there must always
be a next period in which the employee would face negative consequences from cheating.
If not, then the cooperative relationship may fall apart. In such a situation, one or both
players in the game realize that there is no point to maintaining cooperation past the
termination of the game, and each player chooses, in the final period, to cheat, since there
can be no repercussions after that. Since this result—final period cheating—is
predictable, each player then realizes that, if the other player is going to cheat in the final
period, then it makes sense to cheat in the penultimate period as well.73 This reasoning
carries forward all the way even to the first period, destroying the cooperative
relationship altogether. Thus, in extreme cases this “final period problem” can prevent the
business relationship from ever forming.74
So, why would a final period problem develop among employees? The reason is
that accumulated wealth enables employees to leave their jobs. Over time, as an
employee accumulates wealth by saving, the employee becomes enabled to quit her job
and retire, which she will do if she would derive a greater utility from leisure and living
off her accumulated wealth than from working. (See Figure 1.) For any job at any given
wage, a higher degree of past savings (i.e., wealth) makes the employee less likely to
desire employment in the future.75 A wealthier person, all things being equal, chooses to
increase her consumption of leisure.76 If a worker cannot choose to reduce her hours,77
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fees and earn more profits). In addition, Chemmanur and Fulgheiri show that “the ability of financial
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production.” Id at 76.
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the employee has a choice between full employment and full unemployment. At a certain
threshold of accumulated savings (the “exit threshold”), then, the employee is actually
perfectly indifferent between remaining employed or becoming unemployed, while above
that exit threshold the employee would actively prefer to retire.
Figure 1
Employee piggy-bank
Exit threshold -- indifferent between
working and retiring
Savings

Income

Spending

0

1

2

Year

3

. . .n

Figure 1 shows a simple model of employee savings. The black arrow on the left depicts income
paid to the employee, some of which is saved (the black bars), and some of which is spent (the
white arrow on the right). Over time, the employee’s total accumulated savings can rise, as
depicted by the increasing height of the black bars. At time n, the employee has saved up to her
“exit threshold,” which is the point of accumulated wealth where the employee is indifferent
between employment and unemployment. Above the threshold, the employee prefers to retire,
while below it, the employee prefers to remain employed. At or above the threshold, the employee
is indifferent to being fired and blackballed.

non-winners, and that the likelihood of leaving increases with the amount of money won. See George J.
Borjas, LABOR ECONOMICS, at 39.
77
We believe it is generally true that employees cannot reduce hours in the industries that we consider in
this paper. Investment bankers, corporate law associates, and CEOs can rarely choose to work part-time.
Doing so would require hiring an additional employee, which potentially creates free-rider problems (two
bankers on a deal would each choose to shirk), or may result in decreased productivity (one banker running
the deal 100 hours a week may be more “in control” than two bankers running the deal fifty hours a week).
One possibility (which we do not explicitly address in this paper, but which we do not believe would
change the basic results) is that, instead of retiring completely, employees may downshift from one job to a
less demanding, lower paying job. There may still be reputational constraints between such jobs (for
example, the lawyer who leaves the large corporate firm for academia probably has some reputation carryover between jobs), though the extent of this reputational linkage is probably less than between nearly
identical jobs within the same industry (e.g., moving from Sullivan & Cromwell to Davis Polk). For other,
greater shifts, however, there is probably no significant reputation constraint, as where the investment
banker leaves Wall Street to open a restaurant. To generalize from these examples: if there is a negative
correlation between the pay difference between jobs and the degree of reputation linkage between jobs,
then we could conceptualize our model as one in which increasing levels of saved wealth enable increasing
degrees of escape from reputational constraints. While interesting to consider, this would not appear to
affect our analysis.
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An employee who is indifferent between employment and unemployment (or,
even worse, an employee who prefers unemployment) can no longer be disciplined
through the firing and blackballing mechanism: she just doesn’t care. Obviously, this has
implications for the firm that wishes to retain its employees, since if it is costly—in terms
of recruitment expenses, training, or administrative costs—to replace an existing
employee with a new one, then employees who save past the exit threshold will leave the
firm and force the firm to bear these costs.78 For example, consider the market for legal
talent: top corporate law firms face large recruitment and start up costs per entry-level
associate recruited (up to $100,000 per associate recruited),79 only to see 43 percent
depart within three years. While many of these associates leave for comparable firms, a
significant percentage of turnover consists of those who downshift careers (some 56.7
percent of those with known destinations),80 searching for a better quality of life—i.e.,
less hours of work—once their law school loans are paid off. A principal driver of the
decision to work at a large firm is debt; conversely, law associates who have saved
enough to pay their debts tend to leave the firm.81 We might suppose that a law firm that
could reduce savings could decrease turnover, while those that fail to reduce savings
suffer greater attrition. Generalizing from the law context, we might suppose that the
same is true for many sorts of firms. For example, a tech startup that finances itself
partly by granting its employees large equity stakes, such as Google, faces the prospect of
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If there were no costs to replacing and retraining employees, then firms would not care about employee
turnover.
79
See Law Office Management & Administration Report, Nearly One in 11 New Associates Leaves (But
NALP Data Show What Firms Can Do), May 1998. According to the executive director of NALP, it
generally takes three years for an associate to start making money for the firm. See Jenna Ward, Survey
Studies Attrition Rate of Associates, The Recorder, March 12, 1998. The managing partner of Brobeck,
Phleger once estimated that, after two years of employment, the firm had invested $200,000 in each
associate. See Cynthia Cotts, How Firms Keep Their Associates on the Job, The National Law Journal,
June 8, 1998
80
See Amy Delong, Retaining Legal Talent, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 893, 896 (“Each of these transitions would
most likely present a significant reduction in the hours demanded of the associate”).
81
The average law school debt, according to a NALP survey of law associates, was $60,000 as of 1998.
See Jenna Ward, Survey Studies Attrition Rate of Associates, THE RECORDER, March 12, 1998. This raises
an interesting question as to whether a law school could actually improve the desirability of its students by
raising tuition, since this would saddle students with a higher average debt load. This added anti-savings
would tend to lengthen the tenure of entry-level hires, making them more attractive to firms.
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losing many of its employees to early retirement or some form of career-downshifting
once it goes public and those employees become multi-millionaires.82
Even worse than the employee retention issue, however, is that of employee
cheating. When an employee becomes indifferent to being fired and blackballed, the firm
loses its chief tool to constrain employee behavior. So, once the employee reaches her
exit threshold, the threat of being fired no longer affects her decision-making. If the
employee has any opportunity at all to divert cash-flows from firm to herself, to shirk on
the job, to accept kickbacks, or otherwise enrich herself at the firm’s expense, the
employee will exercise that opportunity. Final period cheating problems are exacerbated
where the employee’s compensation has a large variable component, such as
commissions, deal fees, tie-ins, or stock options that may be manipulated in the short
term. The employee can, by cheating, provide an immediate boost to her income and
savings. If this boost puts the employee above her exit threshold, then she will cheat, and
be entirely immune from any reputational penalties the firm could otherwise bring against
her. For example, if an investment banker’s compensation is commission-based, such as
receiving a set percentage of the total value of an acquisition, the banker has the ability to
temporarily boost her immediate compensation by advising a client to complete an
acquisition that the banker knows to be bad.83 Similarly, a top corporate executive could
82

See Kevin J. Delaney and Joann S. Lublin, Google Goes Public: They’re All Rich – Now the Problems
Start, WALL ST. J., August 20, 2004 (describing the incentive problems that Google faces with its newlyrich employees: “when you’re a millionaire, you say ‘Why should I work nights and weekends?’”); see also
nn. [___] infra and accompanying text.
83
The analytical solution we develop in this paper may also apply in other related contexts. For example,
Bruce Johnsen of George Mason University Law School, believes that the anti-savings analysis augments
the arguments in defense of soft dollar brokerage he and Stephen Horan have developed. See Stephen M.
Horan & D. Bruce Johnsen, Does Soft Dollar Brokerage Benefit Portfolio Investors: Agency Problem or
Solution?, unpublished manuscript on file with authors. Horan and Johnsen argue in their paper that
proposals to require fund managers to pay for research out of their own pockets rather than passing on the
cost to shareholders are misguided, noting that commission payments are positively related to risk-adjusted
performance; in other words, soft dollar research payments represent a solution to an agency problem, not a
symptom of one. The argument we develop reinforces this conclusion because attempts to limit soft dollar
brokerage would dramatically increase fund manager compensation and opportunities for cheating. If these
fees are eliminated, fund managers’ fees would increase at a multiple Johnsen estimates would be up to
four times the manager’s salary. This would increase the manager’s savings level and create incentives for
the manager to use index funds (i.e., cheat) and to bank much of the salary instead of spending it on
research. In volatile markets, the “cheating” might not be discovered until the manager has reached the
savings threshold and retired to the Bahamas.
Note that this sort of cheating is a special subset of the more general case we develop. In this
example, the failure to spend the money in a particular way is the cheating, just as it would be cheating for
an executive to fly coach instead of first class, pocketing the difference, with the result that the executive
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“manage earnings” or selectively release good news in order to temporarily boost the
price of the company’s stock, allowing the executive to exercise those options at a higher
price. If these short-term gains are high enough (i.e., they put the employee above her
exit threshold), the banker or executive would not care about her future reputation, and
would cheat.84
Thus, where the mix of savings and the gains to the employee from cheating is
such that the employee who cheats will end up above her exit threshold, and therefore
feel no pain from reputational penalties, we predict that the employee will choose to
cheat. The employee exploits the final period of employment to do whatever enriches her
the most. If the firm can anticipate when this final period will occur, it is possible that the
cooperative relationship could unravel completely,85 meaning that the employment
relationship is never instituted in the first place.86 Even if not, both the firm and the
employee could be made better off if, ex ante, it were possible to bind the employee not
to cheat.87
B.

Shortcomings of Contract and Regulation

We might suppose that the firm and employee would attempt to draft a contract
that binds the employee to the firm (to solve the retention problem) and that punishes the
employee for cheating. For reasons of public policy that we will not go into here, there
are limits on the enforceability of contractual commitments to work—but to make a long

shows up exhausted at an important meeting. The significant difference between the airfare and soft dollar
examples is the magnitude of money involved. Firms may discourage this type of cheating by mandating
and monitoring certain types of expenditures, or by simply paying in a perk that cannot be “cashed in.”
84
In the securities advisory sphere, for instance, Jack Grubman, once Salomon Smith Barney’s star
research analyst, cheated investors by publishing “buy” ratings on stocks that he privately told valuable
clients not to buy. While Grubman was fined $15 million and banned from securities work by the SEC,
Grubman made more than the amount of the fine in a single year (reportedly above $20 million), and hence
may well have come out far ahead. See Dan Ackman, Weill-Grubman Dealings Were Child's Play,
Nov.
14,
2002,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/11/14/cx_da_
FORBES.COM,
1114topnews_print.html (last visited July 14, 2004). Civil suits against Grubman are currently still pending,
so it remains to be seen whether his cheating strategy proves profitable in the long run. See Grubman Civil
Complaint ___.
85
If the cheating is of small enough degree that the employment relationship would still yield a positive
surplus, then the firm could solve the unraveling problem if it can commit not to fire preemptively the
employee. Also, if the firm is unable to determine when, exactly, the employee would surpass her savings
threshold, it is possible that unraveling would not occur. See Dixit, supra n. __, at __.
86
It is possible that, as a halfway measure, the employee is given less responsibility – meaning less overall
ability to cheat – than would be optimal if it were possible for the employee to commit herself not to cheat.
87
This applies to the retention problem as well: if an employee can bind herself not to leave the firm early,
the surplus generated from this can be used to make both employee and firm better off.
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story short, courts will not likely enforce the type of contracts that would force
retention.88
Other problems plague contracts that attempt to limit cheating. Drafting a contract
that covers every possible instance of employee malfeasance is not practicable. And in
order for a contract to be enforceable by the firm, the firm would have to be able to prove
that “cheating,” however it is defined, actually occurred. The verifiability in court of
“cheating” in a general, inchoate sense is probably impossible or unduly expensive,
meaning that the parties would be forced to draft a contract contingent upon readily
observable/verifiable benchmarks. This is undoubtedly done in some instances: firms pay
managers bonuses, for instance, based on verifiable performance metrics, such as
earnings per share. However, benchmarking has its limits since, as one prominent labor
economist describes, “the objective measures of performance available are often such
poor measures of the performance firms really care about that use of formal related pay
schemes can be counterproductive.”89 The attempt to define an appropriate and effective
metric to reduce cheating, and one that is not susceptible to manipulation or is itself not
an incentive to certain types of cheating, is probably illusive. In the case of an earningsper-share metric, the manager might meet or exceed the target in order to maximize her
bonus in the current period, but this is of little value to the firm if it comes at the expense
of share value in the future — in such a case, maximization of the benchmark is itself
cheating.
As an alternative to private contracting, the law could step in to provide a right of
action against employees who have egregiously cheated. Again, there is the difficulty of
specifying all acts of prohibited cheating (even greater than in the private contracting
case since the law is applicable to all firms), and the difficulty of having to verify that an
instance of cheating actually took place. An additional problem is that lawsuits against an
employee for disloyalty, which are public, probably imply negative things about the
claimant as well, leading to underenforcement of private rights. This underenforcement
88

Even the most ironclad non-compete agreements are forced to be limited in duration and geographical
scope. Courts in New York, for instance, will generally not enforce non-compete agreements that are
“unreasonable” (i.e., purporting to endure more than five years, or covering long geographical distances)
absent extraordinary circumstances. See Gimper v. Giaccchetta, 633 N.Y.S. 2d 614 (1995).
89
[___] Malcomson, Individual Employment Contracts, HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, Ch. 35,
at 2337. Such schemes surely motivate certain behavior, but unfortunately they often “motivat[e] the wrong
behavior.” Id.
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problem also limits the effectiveness of public law solutions to cheating. While the SEC
and other government or quasi-government actors (e.g., the NYSE or NASD) provide
some brake on cheating, the limits of prosecutorial resources, the problems of
observability/verifiability that plague private enforcement, and the difficulty in setting
penalties at levels to create optimal deterrence, all limit the effectiveness of regulatory
solutions. So, while regulation provides a solution to some of the most egregious and
obvious instances of cheating, such as outright theft or fraud, for less clear-cut cases of
subtle deception, disloyalty, or shirking, regulatory solutions are inadequate.
So, while contract and regulation may prove useful to an extent, they still leave
large gaps in the ability to constrain employee behavior. But this is not surprising, since
the very purpose, so to speak, of reputation constraints are to permit cooperative behavior
in those instances where contract or regulation are insufficient to reach efficient
outcomes. What is needed, then, is some way to buttress the role of reputation, to shore it
up where it would otherwise fail.
We believe an answer is at hand: as outlined above, reducing or eliminating the
ability of employees to save forces employees to rely upon their reputation and upon the
firm’s good graces. In other words, what is needed is a way to reduce savings, so as to
prevent employees from cashing out and shipping off to the Bahamas. As John Coffee
noted in his diagnosis of the problem after Enron, “the real problem . . . is not equity[based] compensation, or even excessive compensation, but rather excessive liquidity that
allows managers to bail out at will.”90 This problem is the focus of the next Part, where
we describe several mechanisms of savings reduction that firms can, and do, employ to
prevent managers from bailing out at will.

Part IV.

How Perks, Greed, and Cultures of Conspicuous Consumption Help
Strengthen Reputation

We posit that there are three main ways in which firms can solve the final period
problems outlined above. First, the firm can withhold payment until such time as cheating
90

John C. Coffee Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 308 (2003). Coffee rightly identified the problem, but his proposed solution –
“holding periods and retention ratios” – is likely insufficient because of the limitations on deferred
compensation – essentially, the limits on contract – that we describe below.
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would be revealed; this takes the form of deferred compensation (such as corporate loans
which may be forgiven later on). Second, an employer can pay a high degree of in-kind
compensation (or perks) that are not fungible with savings; such perks provide the
employee with utility, but not with the ability to save; this may be the use of a corporate
jet or even an especially expensive meal. Third, employers can invest in causing their
employees to spend more or desire more consumption. This includes hiring “greedy”
people, “addicting” current employees to higher levels of consumption through perks,
and forcing employees to consume at high levels through signaling games. We examine
each of these mechanisms in turn.
A.

Deferred Cash and Corporate Loans

The firm can defer payment of compensation to some later point where cheating
can be better observed. This allows the firm extra time to determine whether the
employee has cheated or not, and puts off the final period problem until a time in the
future. It also requires the employee to stay with the firm at least until the deferred
compensation actually vests in the employee, or else forfeit the deferred amount. By
making compensation linked to future, firm-specific behavior (such as remaining
employed with the same firm), deferred compensation also helps to solve the retention
problem, by providing disincentives to poaching by rival firms.91
The paradigm case of deferred cash is a simple promise to pay some amount of
cash in the future, with the understanding that the firm may withhold payment if the firm
determines that the employee has behaved improperly. Since employees may have
liquidity constraints, in that they require a certain amount of money up front to maintain
an acceptable standard of living, we might expect to see (and, in fact, before SarbanesOxley, often did see) deferred compensation take the form of the corporate loan, where
the firm loans the employee an amount of cash, with the understanding that the loan will
be forgiven at some point in the future if cheating has not occurred. Various forms of
deferred compensation are evident in practice, such as steep wage profiles,92 deferred
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Firms wanting to attract employees from other firms with substantial deferred compensation will be
required to make the employees whole by adding the deferred compensation amount to the starting
compensation package.
92
This is where pay is graduated according to seniority, not productivity: junior employees are underpaid
and senior employees are overpaid. Junior employees are, in effect, “owed” higher wages in the future
(when they become senior) to make up for their underpayment in the past and present. See Lazear,
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bonuses,93 grants of restricted stock or options whose vesting is contingent upon future
employment,94 and, indeed, the well-known (but now largely prohibited)95 corporate loan
that is forgiven in the future.96
The advantage of deferred compensation is that it does not alter the employee’s
spending or consumption behavior, as perks and conspicuous consumption do (which we
will discuss in the next sub-Parts), while, at the same time, it can deter cheating and
improve retention. So, just on those facts, we might suppose that deferred cash would be
a very attractive compensation strategy. However, two questions crop up right away,
which, when answered, place limits on the usefulness of deferred compensation: first,
when can the deferral be paid, and what compels the firm to actually pay in good faith?
Since the employee has no reason not to cheat once she is past her exit threshold,
deferral of compensation must be held back beyond the time that cheating can be
observed. For instance, if a deferred payment would put the employee above her exit
threshold, and if cheating cannot be detected until three years after the fact, the deferred
compensation cannot be paid until three years after the employee has quit the firm in
order to avoid final period cheating. To extend the useful life of the employment
relationship, then, deferred compensation must be deferred until after the employee has
retired; to pay such amounts before retirement is only to push back the cheating problem
to a later period. To put it another way, last round performance is not guaranteed unless
there is some adequate future punishment hanging over the employee’s head.97
Retirement from the Labor Force, HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, CH. 5, at 320; Age and
Productivity: Over 30 and Over the Hill, THE ECONOMIST, June 26, 2004, at 60
93
“[Sixty-three] of the 100 largest industrial firms in the United States have bonus plans with … provisions
for [optional deferral at the Board’s discretion], and forfeiture of any installments not yet paid if and when
the compensation committee finds that the manager committed ‘any act of omission or commission
prejudicial to the interests’ of the firm.” Clifford Smith and Ross Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of
Executive Compensation Plans, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano, ed.), at 166167
94
Thus, if the firm were to fire the employee, the stock or options would not vest.
95
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act forbids loans to directors and executive officers. See Sarbanes Oxley Act,
Section 402. Because of the usefulness of loans as deferred compensation schemes, we believe that this is a
serious mistake, as discussed herein.
96
A notorious example of lending from corporation to executive is the tens of millions of dollars in loans
and loan forgiveness that Tyco awarded to Dennis Kozlowski in 1999, while he was still CEO. See Polek,
supra at __; ___, TESTOSTERONE INC.: CEOS GONE WILD, at 311. Our analysis, as we discuss herein, would
suggest that the timing of Tyco’s forgiveness is the problem: payment of deferred compensation prior to
the ability of the firm to observe all cheating only pushes back, without eliminating, the final period
problem.
97
Lazear, supra n. __, at 322, makes exactly this point.
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Furthermore, one might suppose that unraveling is actually more likely to occur with
deferred compensation, since there is greater certainty that a one-time lump sum payment
would put the employee above her exit threshold98 than if the money was doled out as
services were rendered; firms would have a greater ability to predict and preempt.
For example, suppose that, once an investment banker acquires sufficient wealth,
$5 million, she will quit and retire to the Bahamas. The market wage for such an
employee is $1 million cash.99 In each year, the employee can choose to either behave or
cheat (such as by pushing through inadvisable deals); if she behaves, she gets simply her
$1 million wage, whereas if she cheats, she gets an extra $0.8 million in (unearned)
bonuses, for a total of $1.8 million per year. Assuming in this case it takes three years for
cheating to be discovered, since some time is necessary to determine whether a deal was
a good or a bad deal, and what the role of the banker’s inside information was. Now, if
the firm pays the employee strictly in cash, the firm can anticipate that the employee may
cheat as soon as in year 1: the employee could choose to cheat in years 1, 2, and 3, and
not being discovered until after year 3, the employee would have netted $5.4 million
before she is fired, pushing her above her exit threshold of $5 million. Deferred
compensation can help to solve this problem: the firm can terminate the banker at year 5,
paying her less salary than it takes to get the employee to her exit threshold (in this case,
less than $2.6 million over those five years), and hold off paying her the balance until
year 8.100 In this way, the firm can be assured that the employee has not reached her exit
threshold until the firm can be reasonably sure no cheating has taken place. Then, if no
cheating has occurred, the firm can deliver to her the balance ($2.4 million plus some
amount) that she is owed. Under such a plan, the employee would have a choice between
(a) cheating in any three consecutive years but not reaching her exit threshold (i.e.,
receiving some amount in cash less than $2.6 million as a salary and getting $2.4 million
98

This assumes that the deferral has limited the employee’s past liquidity and consumption, which is not
necessarily true.
99
Or, taking into account some degree of variable compensation, an expected yearly wage of $1 million for
an employee that does not cheat. The exact level of compensation itself could fluctuate from year to year,
depending on various factors, such as market conditions, effort, and competence; this would make it
difficult or impossible for the firm to observe cheating indirectly through the total level of compensation
paid to the employee. For simplicity, though, we will treat the market wage as a set $1 million per year, and
assume that the firm cannot observe the cheating three years after the fact.
100
What is more likely is that the firm would loan her the money, to satisfy her liquidity needs, with the
understanding the loan is to be forgiven in the future if the firm determines that no cheating has occurred.
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in cheating bonuses), and being fired and blackballed once her cheating is discovered,
and (b) behaving for all five years, receiving $5 million, and being indifferent between
employment and retirement.101 In (a), where the employee ends up below her exit
threshold, the employee is worse off than in (b), where the employee is just at her exit
threshold.102 So, the moral of the story is that deferring a great enough amount of cash
compensation until after retirement can avoid the final period problem.
Or can it? With a modicum of reflection, it appears that this arrangement has only
shifted the final period problem to the other party, the firm. If contracts regarding
cheating are hard to draft or enforce, then the firm’s promise to pay in the future is
subject to the same contractual difficulties as would be a contract in which the employee
agrees not to cheat. So the risk of firm opportunism shifts from the employee to the firm:
the firm can renege on its promise to pay, even where the employee has not cheated. As
the labor economics literature recognizes, the greater the amount of deferred
compensation, “the greater the firm’s incentive to act opportunistically and renege on the
promised future wage.”103 However, if the firm is a repeat player,104 and if cheating is
observable to other employees in the labor market,105 then there may be a reputational
check on cheating of this sort, since the firm would have to compensate employees for
the risk of unfair forfeiture, or might not even be able to utilize the deferred
compensation mechanism at all.106 But even taking the nonextreme scenario, where
101

Actually, the firm could pay her any amount less than $2.6 million in an up-front cash wage: since the
most the employee can garner from cheating before being discovered is $2.4 million, paying her less than
$2.6 million still keeps her below her savings threshold and, therefore, honest.
102
For simplicity, we are not taking into account the time value of money, nor are we taking into account
the fact that the employee who works for five years enjoys less leisure than the employee who simply
cheats for three. While these considerations would affect the actual numbers, they do not affect the basic
analysis.
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Lazear, supra n.__, at 320. See also Clifford Smith and Ross Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of
Executive Compensation Plans, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano, ed.) at 167
(“it might be thought that the forfeiture provision would enable the firm to cheat its managers out of their
deferred compensation.”)
104
We would point out that even potentially immortal firms may face end-game situations, especially when
financial distress arises.
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For other employees who cannot directly observe cheating, the search costs in determining whether an
employee did a good job after the fact may be prohibitive. If so, then opportunistic behavior becomes
indistinguishable from good behavior, and, at the extreme, a firm would choose always to cheat, or else
would choose never to deny deferred compensation, since this is the only way that a firm could identify
itself as a non-cheater. Both these outcomes, however, undermine the incentive purpose of deferred
compensation.
106
An anecdote of breach and reprisal: “an example of employee retaliation is … an episode at First Boston
Bank in which a group of highly paid traders quit because they were paid bonuses smaller than they
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cheating is somewhat observable and firm reputation functions somewhat well,
employees would have to be compensated for the increased risk of opportunism that they
bear, with the risk increasing as the amount of deferral, and the gains from firm
opportunism, grows larger. Since the risk premium that employees would require grows
with the amount of deferred compensation, we would expect that deferred compensation
would tend to be of diminishing marginal returns.
This may be why, in practice, deferred compensation is not used as extensively,
nor deferred for as long a period (i.e., until well into retirement), as we might expect from
the preceding analysis. In an ideal world, where the risk of firm opportunism is nil, we
would expect to see that employees would be paid cash of zero, and instead be
compensated entirely in corporate loans that are to be forgiven at retirement, at the firm’s
discretion, in the absence of employee cheating.107 But real world practices fall far short
of this. For example, restricted stock grants are often eviscerated in this regard.108
Investment banks and law firms pay year-end bonuses, rather than deferring such bonuses
for longer periods. Similarly, where corporate loans are used, compensation committees
often allow forgiveness at a time prior to retirement, which precipitates the final period
problem that the deferral was designed to prevent.109
While useful to prevent some instances of cheating, corporate loans and other
deferred cash schemes are not without their shortcomings. In theory, there are some
significant costs to using deferred compensation, and accordingly, in practice, deferred
believed they had been promised and as a result no longer trusted promises for the future.” Malcomson,
supra n.__, at 2353
107
One of the authors has hypothetically put this arrangement forward to his students as a possible
compensation arrangement for them at a law firm. Unsurprisingly, and perhaps correctly, all the students
thought this was a bad idea, principally because they would not trust their employers.
Another reason for the inefficiency of such a compensation scheme is that it deters not just
cheating, but also employee turnover. Deterring turnover may not always be efficient: that is, the option to
leave may be worth more to the employee than it is to the firm (for example, a banker might fear he will
grow to hate New York and want to live in L.A.). We might expect that employees and firms could bargain
around this contingency when it occurs, but the possibility of firm hold-up, in a situation analogous to that
of unfair forfeiture, crops up. Alternatively, firms could loosely agree among themselves to buy out the
deferred compensation of employees who wish to relocate from one firm to another (net outlays would be
expected to be zero, after all); to our knowledge, this does happen in the corporate executive and
investment banking world. Similarly, employees moving from one firm to another generally retain their
seniority, which translates into their position along the steep wage profile.
108
Most senior executive contracts include “accelerated vesting when an executive retires, ensuring that the
horizons of equity incentives for virtually every executive planning . . . retirement are quite short.” Hall at
14.
109
Dennis Kozlowski provides a good example of this. See Polek, supra n.__.
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compensation appears to be limited. Failure to defer enough compensation for a long
enough period of time leads to final period problems on the employee side, while
deferring larger amounts of compensation for very long periods of time increases the risk
of opportunism by the firm. As we will illustrate in the next Part, perks, while still
reducing savings, are not subject to these shortcomings, which can make them a very
important element in the overall compensation scheme.
B.

Perks

Paying employees in perks is a little bit like paying them in heroin: it delivers a
tremendous amount of utility in the short term, none of which can be saved until later
periods. This is useful since perks can incentivize employees to work harder, but do not
allow employees to save for future periods and escape reputational retribution.
Consider again the investment banker from the example in Part IV.A. If paid in
cash, she can earn enough through her salary and through cheating so that she reaches her
exit threshold of $5 million in three years. If firm opportunism is a problem, then it may
not be possible for the firm to ensure good behavior by deferring compensation until after
the term of her employment; a system of corporate loans and forgiveness just won’t work
here. However, there is a solution at hand: even though the market has set a benchmark in
terms of utility that the investment banker must receive, the firm has discretion in what
form that utility will be delivered. The firm can pay less cash so long as it makes up for
the resulting loss of utility, and we might suppose that the firm would choose a form of
in-kind compensation that must be used up right away, so as to deter savings. This would
take the form of the familiar perk—such as corporate jet use—which provide the banker
with significant utility, but which do not allow the banker to save.
More particularly, suppose the banker has a utility function given as Ub = Cash +
1/2 * Perks, where the least she will work for is Ub = 1 million. She values a dollar in
perks the same as fifty cents in cash, meaning that she always prefers cash to perks,
which makes sense since she can always buy the substance of the perk herself with cash,
and because cash also enables her to save for the future. Now, suppose that the firm
expects that at any amount of cash above $500,000, the employee will save significantly,
and eventually reach her exit threshold and cheat. But if cash is $500,000 or less, the
employee will stay permanently (or at least indefinitely) and will not cheat. Suppose that
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where the employee cheats, the firm enjoys low surplus, whereas when the employee
does not cheat, the firm enjoys a high surplus. Then the firm’s expected utility function
from paying the banker is Uf = HighSurplus – Perks – Cash, where the amount paid in
cash is $500,000 or less. If the amount paid in cash is above $500,000, the firm derives
little expected surplus from the employment relationship because of the final period
problem, and its utility function is simply Uf = LowSurplus – Perks – Cash.
Depending on what the two surplus levels are, the firm may or may not choose to
employ the banker. If the low-surplus is, on a per year basis, less than the market wage of
$1 million, and the high surplus is less than $1.5 million, then the firm would choose not
to employ the banker at all. It would cost more to employ the banker than it would benefit
the firm.
However, so long as the high surplus is greater than $1.5 million, the firm would
choose to pay $500,000 in cash, and $1 million in perks. The banker would be indifferent
between that compensation package and $1 million in cash, satisfying the benchmark
wage constraint. However, the difference is that the banker will not be able to save to the
point that she need no longer rely on the firm for her income, becoming reputationproof.110 In this way, the firm avoids a final period problem, and will have the benefit of
the banker’s loyal services into the indefinite future.111 Everyone is made better off
through the liberal use of perks.112
To the uninformed outsider, it will appear that the employee is being paid in
excess of her worth. In the example above, the banker receives $1.5 million in perks and
cash, since that is what it costs the firm, while her market wage should only equal $1
110
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million. This extra half-million might appear to be a windfall to the banker, but in reality
it provides a benefit only to the firm that employs her. Perks may also appear extravagant
and wasteful, which one might take to be evidence of high agency costs or abuse on the
employer or employee’s part. However, it is precisely because perks are extravagant that
they are useful to the firm. Perks must be something that the employee would not choose
to purchase herself; that is, perks cannot be fungible with cash, since fungible perks can
be converted to cash at little or no cost, and that enables the employee to save. For
instance, paying the employee’s rent that she would have paid anyhow would not
constitute a useful perk, but paying for an especially lavish apartment would (to the
extent that it exceeds what the employee would have paid for herself). So we might
expect that perks would appear extravagant—such as Kozlowski’s $2 million birthdaybash in Sardinia—because these are the sorts of things that are not fungible with savings.
This helps explain why a firm might be willing to fly its employees first class or via
corporate jet, but would not be willing to let its employees fly economy and pocket the
difference in fares, since the payment is less valuable (and may even have negative value)
to the firm if the employee can save it.
This conclusion runs counter to the perks-as-stealth-compensation argument by
Bebchuk and Jolls. The test they implicitly propose to determine whether perks are
efficient is whether they are “germane” to an employee’s job function.113 While this
obviously captures a subset of efficient perks, our analysis shows that it is too narrow, in
that some extravagant perks completely unrelated to an employee’s specific work can be
effective at striking an efficient employment bargain. We discuss the characteristics of
good and bad perks in Part V below.
Obviously, payment in perks is costly. If cheating were not a problem in the
above example, the firm would be able to save $500,000 by paying in cash. There may,
however, be ways in which the firm can reduce the cost of paying employees in perks.
Firms could utilize a deferred compensation and perk hybrid: the firm might lend the
employee a sum of money, and earmark that money for a particular purpose, such as
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buying a fancy house or car.114 This has the advantage of allowing the employee to
choose the sort of perk she most prefers and to enjoy present utility, while also preventing
savings and maintaining the threat of firm retaliation—by nonforgiveness of the loan—if
the employee misbehaves in the future.115
Another cost of perks may be that there is an increased likelihood of attracting
employees with high future discount rates; perks are more attractive to high discounters
because they value savings less than low discounters. High discounters are more likely to
cheat than low discounters because they value the future less than low discounters, and
hence are relatively undeterred by future retribution. Accordingly, if perks-based
compensation results in more high-discounters being hired,116 this represents an
additional cost of paying in perks. We believe this could be offset through the
combination of perks with deferred compensation (such as a steep wage profile or
deferred bonus):117 high-discounters are averse to deferred compensation, while lowdiscounters are not. If future discounting presents a significant problem, then this is
another reason to expect that compensation packages will involve a mix of perks and
deferred compensation.
But the point remains that perks are expensive, and once the employee is
adequately perked, paying yet more in perks yields little benefit. So, at least beyond a
certain point, perks, like deferred compensation, are of diminishing marginal returns. We
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turn next to another compensation mechanism—conspicuous consumption—that firms
may also use.
C.

Design of Employees’ Utility Functions
1.

Greed and Addiction

Perks and deferred compensation are expensive options: because the employee
values them less than cash, it would be more efficient if the firm and employee could find
a way to make the employee less likely to save, despite high cash compensation. One
way to do this is to increase the amount of money that the employee would require before
being willing to quit the firm. In the example above, if the banker required $40 million,
instead of $5 million, to retire early, cash compensation would be more effective and the
firm could remunerate the banker with a larger proportion of cash.118 This not only saves
the firm money, but also increases the amount of work that the firm is able to squeeze out
of the employee during her lifetime.
How would the firm do this? The first possibility is through sorting at the hiring
stage. The firm would look for people who have a desire for very large sums of money,
or who have tastes that demand large amounts of consumption. For example, law firms
give summer interns a taste of the good life, with exorbitant lunches and after work
events in posh surroundings, presumably in order to attract those who value such things
most highly.119 Law firm summer programs almost always feature an event at a partner’s
residence in order to show potential associates what they might aspire to in terms of
largesse.120 Some corporate programs feature lifestyle-oriented events such as
consultations with personal image advisors, or wine and scotch tastings. Again, these will
appeal most to material-oriented individuals.
After hiring, the firm can encourage employees to either aspire to greater and
greater amounts of wealth, and to consume lavishly in the short-term, by “addicting”
them to conspicuous consumption through perks. “Zagat culture” in New York law firms,
for instance, which is largely institutionalized through summer associate perks, compels
118
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associates to patronize the city’s most expensive restaurants in order to gain the respect of
their peers.121 The boss who takes her subordinates to expensive restaurants, out golfing,
for a ride in her Porsche, or for afternoon cognac and cigars on a slow day tends, through
doing so, to instill a desire for those comforts in the subordinates. We might even
hypothesize that part of the reason that the most demanding jobs—top tier law and
securities firms—tend to be found in Manhattan is that Manhattan allows employees to
squeeze the greatest amount of consumption into the shortest possible timeframe.122 Over
time, employees may become “addicted” to such a level of consumption, from which it is
difficult to withdraw, since it is difficult to descend to a lower standard of living.123
Among other things, one’s social network, which comprises persons consuming at
similarly high levels, ceases to function if the employee fails to maintain that level of
consumption, adding a distinct cost to socio-economic moves.
Other ways of encouraging consumption are even more permanent. Firms might
encourage employees to get married and start families, since this increases the
employee’s demand for present consumption. An odd example of this point is the
adoption subsidies that many firms now provide: companies like MBNA and Eli Lilly
provide employees who can’t have children up to $20,000 to adopt some.124 Or firms may
subsidize or provide childcare, maternity/paternity leave, and similar benefits which
encourage everyone to have children, since employees with more dependents are less
able to retire early. At the same time, firms might impose on employees lifestyles that
tend to break up families that have already formed; serial polygamy is, after all, one of
the highest forms of conspicuous consumption, since it requires supporting several
families at one. The top executive who pays support to three ex-spouses will have seveneighths of her income already earmarked for her multiple families, meaning that she will
have to have earned eight times the total pay she would have otherwise required to get
out of the business early. There is anecdotal evidence that firms in industries with high
121
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compensation/high variable compensation, like law, investment banking, and consulting,
are notoriously filled with multiple divorcees, often from corporate cultures that tolerate
intrafirm romances. At one well-known law firm, for instance, a widely repeated
aphorism (even by partners) is that the firm’s initials stand for what might be paraphrased
as “Won’t Stay Married.”125 And as one account of the Enron meltdown suggests, the
company created a culture of promiscuity: “in Enron’s work-hard, play-hard culture, the
scent of sex was unmistakable; affairs flourished inside the company.”126
All of this, while perhaps enjoyable, has the effect of reducing savings, and may
also serve to increase the employee’s overall utility for high levels of wealth. In either
case, the final effect is the same: the employee will be less able to accumulate sufficient
wealth to enable her to depart the firm, which avoids a final period problem.
2.

Signaling

The firm might not leave it up to the employee to choose a high level of
immediate consumption for herself. Instead, the firm could compel a high level of
observable consumption from its employees, and thus render the employees more
dependent upon their future paychecks than they otherwise would have been. This serves
as a signal—from employee to firm—that the employee values the longer-term
relationship with the firm.127
It might be expected, for instance, that an employee drive a certain sort of car—
perhaps the same model, or a slightly less fancy one, that the boss drives—in order to
signal that the employee is committed to the firm for the long term (in fact, BMW makes
a line of automobiles of gradated expense that are meant to be marketed to those at
various stages on the corporate ladder; entry-level employees in the “executive segment”
are meant to purchase, of course, “entry-level” BMWs128). Or there may be certain posh
suburbs, expensive restaurants, or fashion designers that one is expected to spend one’s
125
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money on. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that agents will wear expensive clothes
and drive fancy cars in order to impress principals, it may well be that the principal will
require that his agent engage in such consumption, because having spent money on these
things increases the agent’s reliance upon the future relationship with the principal. On a
darker note, employees can signal their commitment by neglecting their family life, and
allowing their families to break up; employees who spend too much time attending to
family, conversely, show that they are not long-term committed to the firm.129
A colorful analogy for exactly this sort of behavior can be found in the court of
Louis XIV, where Louis adopted extravagantly expensive fashions, which his courtiers
were required to emulate. The courtiers thus spent all of their money, and became entirely
dependent upon Louis’ allowances to them.130 In that case, as in the above examples, the
“employee” destroys value through extravagant and wasteful consumption, which serves
to binds herself to the firm (or sovereign, as the case may be). Again, with reference to
the recent outcries against greed in the corporate and securities world, it may well be that
employees who engage in such behaviors are only doing what the firm or client actually
compels them to do.
In this way, Enron was a modern day French court and Chairman Ken Lay a
modern day Sun King. Lay and his aide-de-camp, CEO Jeff Skilling, created a “culture of
excess” that, according to one executive, “could spoil you pretty well.” Lay and Skilling
drove fancy cars and built mansions in tony Houston neighborhoods and Aspen,
Colorado. Their minions followed suit—“At bonus time, there was a rush on Houston’s
luxury car dealerships; flashy wheels . . . were de rigueur for top earners, . . . [and]
[m]any built new homes and vacation properties.”131 According to the special report
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prepared by the board of directors after Enron was wiped out, Enron’s senior leadership
created a culture of spending to excess that permeated the ranks of top executives.132
Even these negative stories of perks and consumption, from cases like Enron,
support our general point that they are effective tools for motivating and retaining
employees. Perks are powerful drugs that can have positive effects; the downside is that
perks, improperly used, can have bad effects as well, a question we consider in Part V.
However, we first wish to point out that it is quite possible that perks are currently at
levels that are too low, from a social perspective; they may be “public goods,” a subject
to which we now turn.
D.

Are Perks Public Goods?

Despite their usefulness as an incentivization tool, there is reason to believe perks
and other savings-reduction technologies133 may be underprovided. Paying in perks and
reducing employee savings reduces cheating not just in the present period, but also serves
to deter cheating, from an ex ante perspective, in past and future periods as well. Since
the employee may often switch firms, deterrence occurs at firms other than the one that
provided the perk, which makes perks look like a public good. Furthermore, competition
among firms may lead to “poaching” of employees, where one firm steals away an
employee by offering a higher proportion of cash compensation. This is essentially a freeriding problem, where one firm can exploit the expenditures of another. These effects
have the potential to lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium where firms pay a lower level of
perks than is socially beneficial.
Consider a simple three period model, where an employee (E) works and saves in
each period. In periods 1 and 2 she works for either of two firms, Firm A and Firm B, and
in period 3 it is revealed whether she cheated in prior periods. She gets some additional
benefit from cheating, but when her cheating is discovered in period 3, she suffers a
severe penalty if she has not saved enough money to make her reputation-proof. So, if
132
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and only if she calculates that she can save adequately in the two periods, she will
maximize her welfare by cheating. If she cannot save adequately to become reputationproof, she will not cheat.
If Firm A were the only firm in the game, Firm A would simply pay the market
wage in periods 1 and 2 with a combination of perks and cash that maximizes its utility.
But it becomes significantly more complicated when there is a possibility that the
employee may switch firms. Suppose that in period 1, Firm A is compensating employee
E with a package of perks and cash that significantly reduces the employee’s savings
from what they would be if she was paid in all cash. This reduction in savings lessens the
likelihood that she will reach her exit threshold where she becomes immune to
reputational harms from cheating. Now, however, in period 2 suppose she were to depart
Firm A for Firm B, and suppose that Firm B pays more cash and less perks. The fact that
Firm A paid her in perks and cash still has an effect in period 2, since her savings is
cumulative from period to period. Firm A has incurred extra expense (it would always be
cheaper to pay the market wage in just cash) to reduce the likelihood of cheating, but now
that expenditure is partially redounding to Firm B’s benefit instead: thus, paying an
employee in perks reduces the likelihood of current period cheating, but also reduces the
likelihood of future period cheating as well. Knowing this, Firm A will provide fewer
(costly) perks than it would if it were the only firm in a given industry, and less than
would be socially desirable to deter cheating.134
134
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firm, which is a positive function (but of diminishing marginal returns) of the total perks paid to the
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Similarly, the payment of perks in any given period can also reduce the incidence
of cheating in past periods. Suppose that E is working for Firm A in period 1, which does
not pay any perks, allowing her to save a great deal of money. However, suppose that, for
exogenous reasons, E knows that she will have to move and seek employment with Firm
B in period 2, which pays almost completely in perks. E knows that she will not be able
to save any money when she is working at Firm B, whereas if she were to work for Firm
A in period 2 as well, she would have saved enough money to cheat. If E’s calculations
lead her to find that she will not be able to save enough money at Firm A in period 1 in
order to become immune from reputational harms, then E will tend to refrain from
cheating at both Firm A and Firm B. The fact that Firm B is paying in perks in period 2
has deterred cheating in both periods 1 and 2, benefiting both Firms A and B.
From this simplified analysis, we should expect that firms would tend to underprovide perks from a social welfare perspective, since individual firms are not able to
capture the full value of the perks that they pay.135 Underprovision becomes worse,
however, when we take into account that firms may intentionally seek to free ride off the
perks of other firms. While all firms would be better off if they could agree to a higher
level of perks, a “prisoner’s dilemma” and free-riding lead them to provide perks at a
sub-optimal level.136 Therefore, even though perks are still quite prominent in the overall
compensation package in many industries, we can say that, as a normative matter, there
ought to be even more.
If this underprovision is significant,137 several reforms may help increase the use
of good perks.138 One obvious way to increase the use of perks is to change the public
discourse about perks. Instead of prosecutors, the media, and academics using perks as
evidence of corporate abuse, the benefits can be highlighted so as to make them more
paid under competition ( 2 P α ) is less than the socially optimal level ( 2P * ) where one firm captures all the
benefits.
135
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socially acceptable. While this may seem superficial, our review of the literature on perks
suggests a form of groupthink that perpetuates the negative view of perks, and contributes
to impeding their use. We offer no specific plan to implement a discursive change beyond
our own modest efforts to highlight the benefits of perks and to look at them in a different
light. We leave it to others to carry the arguments forward pro and con.
Another, perhaps more effective way, is to give good perks more favorable tax
treatment. To a large extent, as discussed above, perks already do receive favorable tax
treatment, either as business-related expenses or de minimis benefits.139 Reducing or
eliminating tax on in-kind benefits would no doubt increase the demand for this type of
compensation by employees. As the delta between the tax rate on cash and that on perks
increases, we will see more payment in perks. (Of course, raising the personal income tax
rate on cash compensation, such as to levels seen many European nations, may have the
same effects.) On the other side of the same coin, the tax treatment of providing perks
could be reformed to encourage their use. For example, tax reforms in 1993 reduced the
deductibility of certain perks as business expenses to 50 percent of the cost of the perks.
While it is likely that employers are less sensitive to tax changes than employees,
increasing the deductibility of perks will undoubtedly result in more perks.
Finally, the free-rider problem could be reduced through increased enforceability
of employment contracts. For example, increased use or improved enforcement of
employment contracts with noncompete clauses might reduce poaching, and therefore
help ensure that firms’ investments in preventing cheating with perks will not be captured
by other firms.
All that said, any decision to encourage more perks (more “good” perks, that is),
must confront the potential downside from perks. There are two primary objections that
must be overcome. The first is the process by which perks are decided and implemented.
We believe that increased transparency and improved governance can provide an
effective brake on the potential for abuse. The second is the possibility that the
extravagant perks we think can be so effective will lead to destructive tendencies among
employees and firms. It is to these issues that we now turn.
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V.

Policy and Normative Implications
So far, we have focused on the good things about these savings reduction

mechanisms: how they may be more efficient than paying cash compensation. But there
are downsides as well. The analogy to heroin is apt not only because there are benefits (to
the provider) from paying in perks but also because there may be significant harms (to
the recipient, and ultimately the provider) as well from the abuse or misuse of perks.
In this Part, we will first propose some guidelines that will help decision makers
(be they corporate boards or judges) better distinguish from good perks and bad perks,
that is, perks that provide useful incentives at reasonable costs and those that are
rightfully condemned as give aways. We then move on to a discussion the downsides of
perks and cultures of conspicuous consumption, and some reforms that we think can help
minimize the harms that these can cause.
A.

Good and Bad Compensation
1.

Perks

Not all perks are created equal. Perks are, in the abstract, not necessarily good for
firms or employees, and in fact, some perks can be themselves destructive or
symptomatic of large agency costs or other wrongdoing. In other words, there are both
“good” and “bad” perks. But how is one—say a board member or judge—to tell the
difference?
Our theory provides a place to start. Good perks will generally be extravagant and
nonfungible, since perks must be something that the employee would not choose to
purchase herself; that is, perks cannot be easily convertible to cash, since that would
enable the employee to save.140 For example, paying an employee’s regular hairdresser is
fungible, since employees would normally have to pay this themselves, meaning that the
employee simply pockets the amount of the transfer in cash. Thus, this type of perk—
what we call “bad” perks—may be evidence of a stealth, abuse, or ignorance. On the
other hand, paying for a complete professional makeover, which the employee would not
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purchase for herself, would not be fungible with savings, and could constitute a good
perk.
For perks that are durable goods, which continue to exist from period to period, to
be good they must not vest permanently in the employee. Ultimate ownership must
remain with the firm, so that the utility of the perk can be withdrawn in the event that the
employee misbehaves. Suppose a firm purchases an extravagant item, such as an antique
umbrella stand, for an executive. If the executive actually acquires ownership of the
umbrella stand, the executive will enjoy its benefits even after he is fired, or he could
always liquidate the umbrella stand for cash. So the purchase of such items outright, for
the employee’s permanent benefit, constitutes a bad perk. Similarly, perks that are
contractually guaranteed, and cannot be revoked, do not serve any legitimate incentive
purpose.141 Without some ability to discipline the employee for cheating that is
discovered in the future, it would be cheaper and more efficient to pay any earned
benefits in cash.
These definitions of good and bad are fairly simple, but they sometimes lead to
counter-intuitive conclusions. For example, the much-pilloried Sardinian extravaganza
thrown by Tyco CEO Kozlowski for his (second) wife has characteristics of a good perk,
since it is unlikely that he would have spent $2 million of his own money for the bash,
and since he couldn’t convert the party to cash that he could then save.142 In contrast,
money received to defray Kozlowski’s or his daughter’s rent, or Martha Stewart’s
hairdresser appointment—which seems perhaps relatively modest and intuitively
reasonable—would be bad perks, since these are things that Kozlowski and Stewart
would have to pay for him- or herself, and thus they are indistinguishable from receiving
cash.
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For example, after Terrence Murray retired as CEO of FleetBoston Financial, he was contractually
guaranteed the use of the company jet for 50 hours per year, a chauffer-drive car, and a corner office with
assistant for life. Joann S. Lublin, How CEOs Retire in Style, WALL STREET J., Sept. 13, 2002, at B1.
142
However, since non-fungibility is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for being a good perk,
concluding that the party was in the end a good perk requires more analysis. After all, the decision to spend
$2 million may have been made unilaterally by Kozlowski without the necessary board oversight or may be
excessive even in light of the potential benefits. But this really cuts more to the matter of overall levels of
compensation and independent board oversight, which we discuss below in part V.B.

46

2.

Corporate Loans

We think it is also possible to tell good from bad corporate loans. Corporate loans
have fallen in and out of favor over the past century—they were considered ultra vires at
common law and in early corporate codes,143 but the practice grew enormously as modern
state law allowed their more liberal use over the past several decades.144 Although
commonly used until banned by recent federal legislation, academics, the media,145 and
the case law146 have roundly criticized their use. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse
Fried claim that corporate loans are inefficient (especially when at “favorable interest
rates”)147 and they are used primarily to camouflage the amount of total compensation to
“reduc[e] the saliency of managers’ compensation” in the eyes of shareholders.148 Other
scholars assume that loans unrelated to specific corporate tasks are per se inefficient and
evidence of wrongdoing.149 These arguments found particular resonance in the political
sphere in the wake of the alleged misuse of corporate loans at firms like Tyco.150 Initial
corporate reform bills—what would become the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—proposed
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See, e.g., Leigh v. American Brake Beam Co., 205 Ill. 147, 151, 68 N.E. 713, 715 (1903) (“A
corporation cannot make loans of money unless the exercise of its chartered powers ordinarily includes
such loans.”); for a general discussion of the history of corporate loans, see Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate
Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 1988 WISC. L. REV. 237, ___ (1988).
144
Nearly all states permit corporate loans by statute, subject to approval by shareholders or directors. See
DGCL § 143 (1983) (“Any corporation may lend money to, or guarantee any obligation of, or otherwise
assist any officer or other employee of the corporation or of its subsidiary, including any officer or
employee who is a director of the corporation or its subsidiary, whenever in the judgment of the directors,
such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation.”).
145
See, e.g., Gary Strauss, Execs Reap Benefits of Cushy Loans, USA TODAY, Dec. 24, 2002, at 1B.
146
Judicial criticism was largely limited to loans where the interest rate was below the prevailing market
rate for similar loans. Courts in these cases occasionally readjusted the interest rate upwards to match the
market rate. See, e.g,,Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1133-34, 435
N.E.2d 712, 722-23 (5th Dist. 1982); see also Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 814, 821, 339
N.Y.S.2d 347, 356 (1972); Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz. 171, 174, 568 P.2d
1069, 1072 (1977) (loan to corporate officer at below market rate of 4% was inherently unfair to the
corporation).
147
Special scholarly scorn is reserved for below-market interest rate loans. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2003)
(concluding that the only fair loans are those where the interest rate is greater than the firm’s weighted
average cost of capital (WACC)).
148
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9813, at 10-11 (July 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w9813.
149
Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 1988
WISC. L. REV. 237, ___ (1988) (“Loans made to facilitate the purchase of stock, or payment of personal
financial obligations, college expenses or income taxes, on the other hand, do not advance specific
corporate purposes.”).
150
See, Tim McLaughlin, Execs’ trial centers on Tyco loans, THE STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 24, 2003, at ___.
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requiring increased disclosure for corporate loans.151 But as the outrage over the
bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom continued to grow, the president gave a speech
condemning the practice of corporate loans, and soon thereafter, Senator Feinstein
offered an amendment to ban them altogether.152 The practice is now illegal.153
This ban is a case of severe overreaching. Encouraging an employee to borrow is
good, since repayment obligations hanging over an employee’s head make her more
dependent upon her future paychecks.154 In this regard, loans are properly viewed as
useful “anti-savings,” into which the employee may be profitably induced to enter with
subsidized interest rates or some likelihood of forgiveness in the future. Forgiving loans
at or before the retirement of the employee, however, can largely nullify the anti-savings
effect of the loan unless some oversight is in place to make sure the employee has
consumed it all. Furthermore, arranging ahead of time (either explicitly or through past
practice) that loans will be forgiven in their entirety is simply a transfer of dollars from
firm to employee without any corresponding future benefit accruing to the firm. Thus,
corporate loans that are later forgiven may be either good or bad, depending upon the
length of deferral or whether the loan was earmarked for a certain sort of consumption.155
Subsidized loans present a slightly different picture. Often, these are earmarked
for a particular purpose, such as buying a house. Subsidization may be useful insofar as it
can encourage an employee to spend more than the employee would have chosen to
spend. For example, a $1 million subsidized loan to buy a house induces the employee
who would have preferred only a $300,000 home to spend more than would have been
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See S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002) (requiring only “8K reporting within 7 days of the making of covered
loans.”).
152
See Remarks of President George W. Bush at New York Stock Exchange, July 9, 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-4.html (“And I challenge compensation
committees to put an end to all company loans to corporate officers.”). Notably, the president called for
firms to ban the practice, not the government. He nevertheless signed the ban into law.
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See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §402, 116 Stat. at 787 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §78m (West Supp.
2003).
154
This is also a highly controversial statement if you believe popular accounts. See, for example, Elizabeth
MacDonald, Crony Capitalism, FORBES, June 21, 2004, at 140-6 (describing loans to CEOs as in “bad
taste” and proposing that “[d]irectors should give serious thought to just giving the boss a pay raise, if he’s
really hard up, and knocking off the monkeyshines” of corporate loans).
155
See, e.g., JOHN TARRANT, PERKS AND PARACHUTES, 239-40 (1985) (“Sometimes the front money
needed to recruit senior executives is too big to fit under the heading ‘bonus.’ So the payment is made in
the form of a loan, at low interest or perhaps no interest. Since the loan must be repaid, it serves as an
effective set of golden handcuffs. However, the loan need not always require repayment.”).
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her initial preference. In return for a lower interest rate or other favorable terms, the firm
receives a debt-laden employee who can be better trusted.
Corporate loans can be improperly used, of course, but they can also be highly effective,
valuable to the firm, and fairly easy to monitor. Corporate loans to employees that are
earmarked for a specific use and are required to be repaid are a good way of
compensating employees because they provide strong incentives to remain with the firm
and because the value of the loan is not in question. Alternatively, corporate loans that
can be forgiven far enough in the future can also deter cheating. These add value to the
firm, and the Sarbanes-Oxley ban sweeps too broadly in eliminating it from mix of
compensation choices firms may use.
B.

The Dark Side of Perks, and Potential Governance Reforms

It is possible that perks may work too well. For example, since perks are a
powerful tool for employers to prevent wealthy employees from retiring, an employee
might be willing to misbehave (by say hiding bad news or inventing good news) in order
to keep her job and enjoy the benefits of office. This preservation instinct is likely to be
especially problematic in situations in which the perk recipient can determine (or greatly
influence) the perks she receives. Thus the problem is much more likely to occur in the
corporate context, where the recipients of most “excessive” perks—the officers and
directors—have great discretion to determine perks as well as their own employment
status. The anecdotal evidence and our interviews corroborate this potential weakness of
perks. For example, Brian Hall illustrates the value executives place on their office with
the story of the CEO of Circon Corporation who “strongly resisted a takeover attempt . . .
that would have raised the value of his . . . shares by more than $10 million” because he
valued the perks of his employment, such as “a fancy office” with “a private eating
terrace,” more than the money. As one CEO we talked to put it, “it seems silly when I
think about it, but the fringe benefits of corporate life are hard to replicate in retirement—
I’ll miss the lifestyle as much as the [business] challenge when I’m retired.” This
problem is less likely in other industries with similar last period problems, like
investment banking or law, where perks are typically set by a rotating group of firm
partners.
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So how do firms prevent the use of perks from being abused, either by selfserving or self-preserving recipients? In the language of our drug dependency analogy,
how do firms prevent their heroin addicts from becoming junkies? And how do firms
prevent executives from awarding themselves perks that are not justified by the antisavings analysis we provide.
First, there should be director oversight. Disinterested, well-informed directors
should monitor the use of significant of perks, like the use of corporate jets and the size
of expense accounts for top managers.156 At some point, as with all significant
compensation issues, the board needs to know how much was paid out, and to whom it
went. This proposal is a significant change from current behavior. Prior to the recent
batch of corporate reforms, directors exercised little real control over perks taken by
management.157 While we do not share the overall pessimism of some observers that
perks are evidence of high agency costs that justify a broad set of governance reforms, it
is clear that there is potential for managers to self-award perks that do not serve the
purposes discussed in this article. The aggressive use of perks we recommend in this
article requires heightened corporate governance standards among employees who can set
their own compensation, given the opportunities for stealth and misappropriation.158
Second, an increased role of disclosure and investor oversight might be useful.
There is already a fair amount of disclosure under current law—significant perks to top
executives must be disclosed in SEC filings.159 A recent study of CEO employment
156

This proposal is similar to that proposed by the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: compensation
decisions, including perks, are valid if they are authorized in advance or ratified by disinterested directors
in an informed manner or if there has been approval or ratification by disinterested shareholders and the
compensation did not constitute waste at the time of the vote. See ALI Principles of Corporate Governance
§ 5.03.
157
While the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were silent on the issue of compensation oversight, the listing
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supervision, requiring a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors to approval
all significant components of executive compensation. See NYSE section 303A; NASD Rule 4350. While
perks are not specifically enumerated in these rules, corporate advisors advocate such oversight as best
practice. See Wendy J. Hilburn, Counseling the Compensation Committee, 1395 PLI 1017, 1022 (Nov.
2003).
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total is required (in a footnote or narrative) only for each perquisite that exceeds 25% of the total
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contracts in securities filings finds that they are "quite specific about the types and
quantities of perquisites given," and that about 40 percent mentioned the use of a
company car, 25 percent membership in a country club, and less than 10 percent use of a
company aircraft.160
However, there are reasons why disclosure may be inadvisable. If savings
reduction is a public good, as described above in Part IV.D, then disclosure of which
employees are “perked,” and to what degree, enables poaching. Another consideration is
that disclosure of compensation appears to lead to increased competition for highly
valued employees, possibly to the detriment of shareholders.161 For example, a CEO who
sees what another firm’s CEO is receiving in perks may demand the same, even if that
would not be appropriate given the particular circumstances.162
Third, courts can exercise some oversight, but this is likely to be quite weak and
limited to procedural issues. Courts rarely find that compensation decisions violate the
business judgment rule or constitute waste, and no court has specifically passed on the
merits of a case questioning the excessiveness of perks.163 This reluctance seems right, as
courts are not well positioned to evaluate the merits of specific compensation levels or
perks, and, as the ALI has concluded, other factors, such as disclosure and approval by
compensation committees, likely provide sufficient oversight.164 As several Delaware
judges recently opined, the role for courts is primarily procedural—that is, making sure
perquisites by type and amount. Some commentators believe that the current disclosure rules are wholly
inadequate, and that they allow self-serving executives to camouflage excessive pay and benefits. See, e.g.,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, NBER Working
Paper 9813, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9813 (July 2003). The argument for disclosure is
much weaker because we show that perks are not necessarily stealth compensation but are more likely an
efficient way to augment reputation and deter cheating. Moreover, the free rider/public good problem we
identify militates against increased disclosure absent other reforms.
160
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEO’s Bargain For?: An Empirical Study of Legal
Components of CEO Employment Contracts, Vanderbilt Law & Economics Working Paper No. 04-12,
unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=529923.
161
See generally, Ryan Miske, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673 (2004).
162
Another way of putting it is that the purported “stealth” qualities of perks may work to the firm’s
advantage by avoiding cutthroat competition in the labor market.
163
See __Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L.
231, 247-51 (1983); Eric L. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans,
Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145 (2000); Randall S. Thomas
& Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
569 (2001); Charles M. Elson, Courts and Boards: The Top Ten Cases, American Law Institute - American
Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, November 12, 1998.
164
See ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.03.
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that boards exercise considered judgment when approving compensation for senior
executives.165 This type of oversight should apply equally to perks.
C.

Problems with Cultures of Conspicuous Consumption

Conspicuous consumption by employees does not present the severity of danger
that corporate perks do, since employees are spending their own money and not the
company’s; dipping into the corporate coffers is generally not an issue. However, there
are a number of ways in which encouraging employees to fetishize material comforts
might have negative effects.
First, there could come a point where too much spending actually makes
employees less trustworthy. As employees begin to live beyond their means, we may
expect that employees also begin to become more tempted to cheat as a way to finance
their higher standard of living. For example, an employee who is underwater with
gambling debt may resort to stealing from the till in order to pay off her bookie. Or a law
firm partner who cannot meet her alimony, country club, or second house payments
might choose to trade on a client’s confidential inside information. So, here, we might
suppose that if a firm addicts an employee too quickly to too high a level of consumption,
that strategy could well backfire on the firm by encouraging the employee to cheat.
Second, a culture of unabashed greed may reward and encourage employees who
have morally questionable characters, or may help to shape employees’ characters in
ways that we find aesthetically and morally unappealing. Is there a social cost,
somewhere down the road, if the bright-eyed, idealistic, and talented students who enter
business and law school emerge, say, twenty years later as businessmen and women
cynically engaged in a never-ending race for greater and greater degrees of material
comfort? It is difficult to say for sure: the Ron Perelmans of the world may be, in the
view of most people, unpleasant at best, but whether they represent a necessary cost of
well-functioning capitalism is debatable. On a more practical note, however, greed may
be correlated with other negative personality characteristics, such as opportunism,
egocentrism, and dishonesty, or we might suppose that the proliferation of greedy culture
signals to employees that such behavior is socially acceptable.

165

Id at ___.

52

Third, a lot of the spending that cultures of conspicuous consumption encourage
appears to be, at first glance, socially wasteful, at least to the extent that ex post there are
other ways in which we would prefer the money to be spent. We might suppose that
everyone would be better off if highly compensated employees were encouraged to live
modestly, perhaps donating the surplus to good causes or investing in the capital markets,
instead of lavishing their swollen paychecks on luxury goods, such as Ferraris and
Rolexes, that quickly lose their value. In short, this mode of employee incentivization
may fuel a rat race that, while benefiting shareholders, externalizes costs onto society.
Finally, one might object that cultures of conspicuous consumption may
discourage value-adding cooperation because of their emphasis on materialistic selfinterest. The corporation as cooperative venture, as Lynn Stout postulates,166 may fail to
function as well as it could where employees are engaged in short-sighted and singleminded maximization of near-term consumption. Such employees will tend to shun
cooperative efforts where results (and, hence, performance bonuses) are not easily
attributable to individual employees. In contrast, if employees are motivated more by
soft, qualitative considerations such as friendship, loyalty, or a sense of duty, they may be
more willing to undertake cooperative projects where individual effort and effectiveness
are not readily observable.
Definitive answers to these problems are not forthcoming (at least not in this
paper), though we can venture some qualified guesses as to how they would be resolved.
The first and last objections, while presenting difficult empirical questions of how
employees are motivated and what makes a corporation work effectively, are probably
best left to corporations to figure out for themselves. Shareholders, directors, and
employees of the corporation should internalize most, if not all, of these costs, and they
are the ones who have the ability to figure out amongst themselves what best minimizes
these costs relative to the possible gains. To the extent that a solution makes one group
better off than another, the winners can always compensate the losers with part of the
surplus
The second and third objections, however, present the possibility of significant
externalities that fall outside of the corporation itself. As for the third issue—the
166
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wastefulness of extravagant spending and the possible crowding out of more socially
beneficial activity—we think it is unlikely that a regulatory solution is forthcoming (at
least in the corporate law sphere). Personal preferences and the ability of firms and
employees to contract for mutually satisfactory compensation are an area into which we
do not believe the government can competently intervene. And macroeconomic effects, if
any, such as decreased savings or decreased investment in the capital markets, can
probably be better countered through tax policy than through substantive corporate law.
On the other hand, we think the issue of dysfunctionally ambitious corporate
culture does present a possible case for regulation. If the gears of business and corporate
law are consistently grinding down society’s best people into unrepentant robber barons,
there may be a distinct cost that is borne by society as a whole. If (though it’s a big if)
cultures of excess regularly result in massive meltdowns such as Enron, Adelphia, and
Tyco, which can disrupt the wider economy; then the law has an interest in stepping in to
limit the proliferation of these cultures. One possible method of regulation is to force
corporate executives to internalize some of these costs by making them more readily
liable for corporate malfeasance; then, in choosing what sort of culture to implement,
corporate CEOs would take care not to generate future Andy Fastows. The recent
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms have already placed some of these costs onto top
management;167 whether this has gone too far, or not far enough, is a debate we will not
enter into in this paper. It is our hope, however, that our analysis provides a useful
framework for considering this question, and others like it, in future scholarship.

VI.

Conclusion
Firms can benefit from paying their employees in perks, deferred compensation

such as corporate loans, and by encouraging conspicuous consumption. This benefit
arises from the way in which these compensation devices foster future dependence upon
the firm: employees are unable to save and accumulate wealth from period to period, and
thus do not reach the point where they would become immune to reputational or
retributive penalties. While these tools are a powerful augmentation of a firm’s ability to
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police its employees, they can also have a downside, since they can also lead to
undesirable employee behavior when inappropriately or excessively implemented. Thus,
such compensation schemes are not fool proof, and oversight is no less important than
with ordinary cash compensation. However, we do believe that current legislation and
scholarship have taken too extreme a position against these practices and have not
recognized the benefits that these very powerful tools can provide.
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James C. Spindler
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
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